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 The thirty-six days following the November 7, 2000, presidential 
election was an amazing period in the legal and political history of 
the United States. Lawyers, judges, and election officials in Florida 
found themselves participating sometimes unwillingly in a national 
media spectacle. Some observers saw this postelection turmoil in 
Florida as a crisis for this country. Others viewed it as an interna-
tional embarrassment. The outcome brought elation for many and 
cynicism from others who explained the result as a triumph of power 
and politics over justice and the will of the people. 
 For columnists and law faculty, the events in Florida and the rul-
ing of the United States Supreme Court on December 12 in Bush v. 
Gore1 provided an opportunity for decrying the “frail underside of 
elections”2 and speculating about the “legacy” of the Supreme Court 
opinion for voting rights nationwide.3 In an op-ed piece in The New 
York Times, Columbia Law School professor Sam Issacharoff posited 
that: 
                                                                                                                    
 * Visiting Professor of Law, University of Texas at Austin. The author is a partner 
at Bickerstaff, Heath, Smiley, Pollan, Kever & McDaniel LLP, in Austin, Texas. He has 
practiced election law for more than 20 years and has represented clients in statewide re-
counts in Texas. 
 1. 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (per curiam). 
 2. SAMUEL ISSACHAROFF ET AL., WHEN ELECTIONS GO BAD: THE LAW OF DEMOCRACY 
AND THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION OF 2000, at i (rev. ed. 2001). 
 3. See Samuel Issacharoff, The Court’s Legacy for Voting Rights, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 
14, 2000, at A39.  
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[T]he Supreme Court may have given us an advancement in voting 
rights doctrine. It has asserted a new constitutional requirement: 
To avoid disparate and unfair treatment of voters. And this obliga-
tion obviously cannot be limited to the recount process alone. . . . 
The court’s new standard may create a more robust constitutional 
examination of voting practices.4 
Elsewhere in this issue, Professors Richard Briffault and Richard L. 
Hasen offer their informed opinions regarding the effect of Bush v. 
Gore on election law and state election systems.5 In general, the re-
cent wave of articles tends to analyze the events in Florida without 
regard to how an election recount and contest might proceed under 
more normal circumstances.6 As a result, these articles underesti-
mate the integrity and vitality of the existing state election processes 
nationwide and overestimate the need for corrective rules or laws by 
Congress or state legislatures.  
 This Article suggests that the events in Florida and the resulting 
decisions of the Florida Supreme Court and United States Supreme 
Court are best understood against the backdrop of the state law 
processes and jurisprudence that usually govern the outcome of an 
ordinary election dispute. Measured against this backdrop, the elec-
tion recount and contest process in Florida functioned in reasonably 
good order under the circumstances and, had adequate time been 
available, probably would have produced a reasoned and credible 
outcome. The problems in Florida that plagued the postelection proc-
ess and ultimately led to the unsettling decision in Bush v. Gore are 
largely attributable to external factors, not to flaws within the elec-
tion process itself. 
 The circumstances that confronted the postelection process in 
Florida were novel only in the magnitude of the external factors af-
fecting the operation of the recount and election contest process. The 
                                                                                                                    
 4. Id. 
 5. See Richard Briffault, Bush v. Gore as an Equal Protection Case, 29 FLA. ST. U. L. 
REV. 325 (2001); Richard L. Hasen, Bush v. Gore and the Future of Equal Protection Law 
in Elections, 29 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 377 (2001). 
 6. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, “In such Manner as the Legislature Thereof May Di-
rect”: The Outcome in Bush v. Gore Defended, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 613 (2001); Samuel Issa-
charoff, Political Judgments, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 637 (2001); Michael W. McConnell, Two-
and-a-Half Cheers for Bush v. Gore, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 657 (2001); Frank I. Michelman, 
Suspicion, or the New Prince, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 679 (2001); Richard H. Pildes, Democracy 
and Disorder, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 695 (2001); Richard A. Posner, Bush v Gore: Prolegome-
non to an Assessment, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 719 (2001); David A. Strauss, Bush v. Gore: What 
Were They Thinking?, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 737 (2001); Cass R. Sunstein, Order Without Law, 
68 U. CHI. L. REV. 757 (2001); John C. Yoo, In Defense of the Court’s Legitimacy, 68 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 775 (2001); Nelson Lund, The Unbearable Rightness of Bush v. Gore (Apr. 26, 
2001) (unpublished manuscript, from “Votes and Voices” symposium at Benjamin N. Car-
dozo School of Law), available at http://papers.ssrn.com; Robert H. Bork, Sanctimony Serv-
ing Policies: The Florida Fiasco, THE NEW CRITERION, Mar. 2001, at 4; Robert F. Nagel, 
From U.S. v. Nixon to Bush v. Gore, THE WKLY. STANDARD, Dec. 25, 2000, at 20. 
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legal issues and proceedings took on a surreal appearance primarily 
because of the importance of the election, the intensity of the media’s 
scrutiny, the magnitude of the forces employed on both sides of the 
election conflict, and the brevity of time available for the participants 
and the courts to address complex legal and factual issues. These 
same factors often play a significant role in state recounts or election 
contests. The differences encountered in Florida were a matter of de-
gree, not a matter of kind. 
 Examining the events in Florida in the context of general election 
law jurisprudence also provides important insights into what went 
wrong for the Gore legal strategy. The Gore team simply lost the le-
gal battle. Gore’s postelection legal strategy was flawed from the be-
ginning, largely because it failed adequately to appreciate the gen-
eral principles and dynamics that historically have governed the con-
duct of recounts and election contests nationwide and that almost 
certainly would eventually control the outcome in Florida. There was 
essentially no chance from the beginning of the postelection dispute 
that any candidate could win an election contest in the time avail-
able. Gore’s sole chance for victory laid in the administrative recount 
process. That opportunity was squandered. 
 Part I of this Article provides an overview of the general princi-
ples found in election law nationwide governing the canvass, recount, 
and contest aspects of elections. Part II describes the postelection 
events in Florida. Part III discusses the major opinions of the Florida 
Supreme Court and the opinion of the United States Supreme Court 
in Bush v. Gore. To minimize unnecessary repetition of the descrip-
tions available elsewhere in the papers of this symposium, I focus 
primarily on the Gore v. Harris7 opinions of the Leon County Circuit 
Court and Florida Supreme Court. Part IV discusses the probable 
impact of Bush v. Gore and the events in Florida on election law gen-
erally. Finally, I consider the events in Florida in terms of candidate 
Gore’s losing legal strategy. 
I.   GENERAL PRINCIPLES GOVERNING POSTELECTION DISPUTES 
 An election is a process, not an event. The objective of this process 
is to determine the will of the electorate as expressed by qualified 
voters casting ballots in accordance with applicable state law. De-
tailed state statutes and administrative regulations govern the proc-
ess in every state.8 The specifics of these statutes and regulations 
                                                                                                                    
 7. Gore v. Harris, No. 00-2808, 2000 WL 1770257 (Fla. 2d Cir. Ct. Dec. 4, 2000), 
rev’d, 772 So. 2d 1243 (Fla. 2000), rev’d sub nom. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000).  
 8. State statutes often are compiled in a separate election code, such as the Texas 
Election Code. Administrative rules are promulgated and published by the state’s chief 
elections officer. Florida’s election law statutes appear generally in Florida Statutes chs. 
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vary significantly by state. It is possible, however, to make generali-
zations about the procedures followed by the states in the counting of 
state and federal ballots and about the election law principles ap-
plied by the state courts.9 This Article examines these general proce-
dures and principles as they exist for the canvassing and recounting 
of ballots and for contesting an outcome in an election. 
A.   Canvassing Ballots and Certifying the Outcome of an Election 
 The Secretary of State serves as the chief elections officer in most 
states. This official generally is responsible for implementing and en-
forcing the state’s election laws through regulations, official opinions, 
and unofficial guidance for local government officials. These local 
government officials usually bear responsibility for conducting the 
election, including the obligation as governed by state law to pur-
chase, maintain, and operate voting devices at which votes are cast, 
as well as any electronic or electromechanical systems used for 
counting ballots. The primary means of in-person voting include pa-
per ballots read manually, levered machines, prescored punch cards, 
direct recording electronic (DRE) machines, and paper ballots read 
by optical scan equipment.10 Absentee ballots are usually paper bal-
lots read manually or with optical scan equipment. Each of these 
means of voting and counting votes has vulnerabilities.11  
 Election returns from a general election usually are tabulated by 
the local election officials.12 For punch card ballots and paper ballots, 
the counting or tabulation of votes can occur at the precinct or at a 
central counting location as prescribed by state law. Levered ma-
chines are inspected and the vote tabulated at the precinct. This is 
also true of the DRE machines. Results obtained at the precinct level 
are communicated to the central election office and added by county 
election officials to the results from other precincts.13 Within a pre-
scribed period after the day of the election, these results are officially 
canvassed by designated local government or canvassing officials.14 
The canvass usually consists only of officially opening the returns 
                                                                                                                    
101-102. The Florida Legislature amended the election code in the 2001 session. See Flor-
ida Election Reform Act of 2001, 2001 Fla. Laws ch. 01-40, at 117-73. 
 9. See generally NAT’L ASS’N OF STATE ELECTION DIRS., ELECTION ADMIN. SURVEY 
(2001) [hereinafter 2001 ELECTION ADMIN. SURVEY] (compiled by the association following 
the 2000 election and in response to events in Florida), and the individual state responses 
on which the survey compilation is based. 
 10. See ROY G. SALTMAN, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, ACCURACY, INTEGRITY AND 
SECURITY IN COMPUTERIZED VOTE-TALLYING (Aug. 1988) (Nat’l Bureau of Standards, Spe-
cial Pub. No. 500-158). 
 11. See id. 
 12. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 102.112 (2000) (amended 2001). 
 13. See, e.g., id. § 101.5614 (amended 2001); TEX. ELEC. CODE § 67.017 (2000). 
 14. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 102.112 (2000) (amended 2001); TEX. ELEC. CODE § 67.003 
(2000). 
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from the precincts and recording and tabulating the votes for each 
candidate.15 In many jurisdictions, this recording and tabulation of 
votes already has been accomplished by election officials, and the 
canvass is pro forma. 
 The county governing body or canvassing board certifies the win-
ner of local general elections.16 An official certificate of election is is-
sued.17 The county governing body or canvassing board usually is re-
sponsible also for totaling the returns from within the county in 
multicounty and statewide elections and for forwarding the results 
for these elections to the state officer, board, or legislature responsi-
ble by law for officially canvassing the votes and certifying the out-
come for these elections.18 For political party primary elections, the 
county and state executive committees for the party usually perform 
the same canvass and certification duties performed respectively by 
the local and state officials for the general election.19 
 State laws strictly control the secrecy of the ballots and the access 
of persons to paper or punch card ballots that could be altered to 
change or add votes for a candidate. Meticulous records must be kept 
throughout the process of the names of voters, number of ballots 
used, number of spoiled ballots, and number of voted ballots to better 
prevent fraud, as well as to allow a review of the vote counting proc-
ess, if necessary, after the election. Ballots and levered or DRE vot-
ing machines remain in custody for a period as prescribed by state 
law following the election to ensure the ability of election officials 
and courts to verify vote totals as necessary to resolve any disputes 
arising from the election.20 
B.   Recounting Votes 
 A process for recounting votes exists in virtually every state.21 The 
process generally is administrative in nature, with the recount con-
ducted through the government authority responsible for conducting 
the election or through a special government committee or commis-
sion created for the purpose of the recount.22 Sometimes, the recount 
                                                                                                                    
 15. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 102.061 (2000) (amended 2001); TEX. ELEC. CODE § 67.004 
(2000). 
 16. See, e.g., TEX. ELEC. CODE § 67.016 (2000). 
 17. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 102.155 (2000) (amended 2001); TEX. ELEC. CODE § 67.016 
(2000). 
 18. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 102.141 (2000) (amended 2001); TEX. ELEC. CODE §§ 67.007, 
67.008 (2000). 
 19. See, e.g., TEX. ELEC. CODE §§ 172.119, 172.120 (2000). 
 20. See, e.g., id. 
 21. See 2001 ELECTION ADMIN. SURVEY, supra note 9; see, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 
102.166(4)-(10) (2000) (amended 2001); TEX. ELEC. CODE §§ 211-15 (2000). 
 22. See, e.g., State ex rel. Crawford v. Del. Cir. Ct., 655 N.E.2d 499 (Ind. 1995) (noting 
that under applicable Indiana law, the judge appoints a recount commission). 
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must occur before ballots are canvassed or election results are certi-
fied, with the recounted totals being substituted for the initial tally.23 
In some states, however, a recount may continue after the outcome of 
the election has been certified.24 
 Many states provide for a recount of ballots automatically if the 
difference of votes between candidates meets some statutory thresh-
old.25 This recount or “retabulation” of votes generally consists of 
simply reprocessing the same ballots back through the same manual 
process or counting machines used in the original tally of votes. A 
manual recount generally occurs only in defined circumstances and 
only if specifically requested by a candidate or voter.26 A recount, in-
cluding a manual recount, is intended to identify and to correct any 
inaccuracies in the initial tally caused by human error or equipment 
malfunction.27 The government officials are concerned with accuracy 
in the vote totals, not the outcome of the election. It is the candidates 
and their partisan representatives who are concerned with using the 
recount to win an election.28 
 Most recounts occur at the local level even for statewide or 
multijurisdictional elections. In many states, recounts can proceed on 
a county-by-county29 or even a precinct-by-precinct basis in 
multicounty and statewide elections because the alleged human error 
or equipment malfunction in question probably did not occur 
throughout the election jurisdiction.30 To require a manual recount in 
all counties or precincts because of errors in only one or a few coun-
ties or precincts within the election jurisdiction would effectively 
make manual recounts impossible because of cost.  
 Essential to fairness under such a decentralized recount scheme 
for multicounty elections is the entitlement of candidates, or their 
partisan representatives, to witness the government officials as they 
recount the ballots and thereby are able to observe any irregularities 
in the process or any illegal votes included or legal votes excluded 
                                                                                                                    
 23. See 2001 ELECTION ADMIN. SURVEY, supra note 9; see, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 
102.166(4)(b) (2000) (amended 2001); TEX. ELEC. CODE § 213.057 (2000). 
 24. See 2001 ELECTION ADMIN. SURVEY, supra note 9; see, e.g., OKLA. STAT. Tit. 26, § 
8-116 (2000). 
 25. See 2001 ELECTION ADMIN. SURVEY, supra note 9; see, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 
102.166(4)(d) (2000) (amended 2001); NEB. REV. STAT. § 32-1119 (2001). 
 26. See 2001 ELECTION ADMIN. SURVEY, supra note 9; see, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 102.166 
(2000) (amended 2001); TEX. ELEC. CODE § 214.042 (2000). 
 27. Siegel v. LePore, 120 F. Supp. 2d 1041, 1050 (S.D. Fla. 2000) (describing the pur-
pose of a manual recount as “detecting and correcting clerical or electronic tabulating er-
rors”), aff’d, 234 F.3d 1163 (11th Cir. 2000) (en banc), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1005 (2000). 
 28. See TIMOTHY DOWNS ET AL., THE RECOUNT PRIMER 3 (1994). 
 29. The reference to “county” in this context is intended as generic for the local gov-
ernment generally charged with carrying out elections. Instead of a county, this local 
government may be a parish, township, or other local entity. 
 30. See, e.g., TEX. ELEC. CODE § 212.001(5) (2000). 
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from the vote total.31 If disputes arise that cannot be resolved at the 
administrative stage, an election contest is available to challenge an 
uncorrected irregularity or vote tabulation before an impartial arbi-
ter. 
 Specific aspects of the recount process in Florida during 2000 that 
proved important in the battle for presidential votes included: (1) a 
provision for an automatic recount statewide;32 (2) authority for a 
candidate subsequently to file a protest in a county that the returns 
of the election in the county are erroneous and to request a manual 
recount;33 (3) authority for a local canvassing board, in response to 
such a protest, to order a limited manual recount of not less than 
three precincts;34 and (4) authority for the canvassing board to 
manually recount all ballots in the county if the limited manual re-
count “indicates an error in the vote tabulation which could affect the 
outcome of the election.”35 
C.   The Contesting of an Election 
 Election contests were unknown at common law.36 They consti-
tuted special statutory authority for courts to intervene in the other-
wise legislative or political election arena.37 As a result, election con-
test statutes as a rule are strictly construed. 
 An election contest generally is initiated by a losing candidate or 
candidates after the outcome of an election has been certified and a 
winner has been declared. State courts have established presump-
tions in favor of the accuracy of a certified election outcome.38 There-
fore, any contestant has the significant burden of showing that the 
certified results should be overturned. Moreover, state courts often 
have established threshold requirements for election contests by re-
quiring specificity in the pleading of alleged election irregularities 
                                                                                                                    
 31. See FLA. STAT. § 102.166 (2000) (amended 2001); see also Miller v. County 
Comm’n, 539 S.E.2d 770, 776 (W. Va. 2000) (indicating that a recount gives candidates the 
opportunity to (1) observe the manner in which the recount is conducted, (2) notify the 
canvassing board of their intentions regarding requesting a recount in precincts not re-
quested by the candidate originally requesting the recount, and (3) identify ballots that 
may be challenged as irregular or illegal in an election contest). “Inherent in the recount 
procedures is the concept of fairness to all interested candidates in an election.” Id. at 776. 
 32. FLA. STAT. § 102.166(4)(d) (2000) (amended 2001). 
 33. Id. § 102.166(4)(a) (amended 2001). 
 34. Id. § 102.166(4)(d) (amended 2001). 
 35. Id. § 102.166(5) (amended 2001). 
 36. See Harless v. Lockwood, 332 P.2d 887, 888 (Ariz. 1958); McPherson v. Flynn, 397 
So. 2d 665, 668 (Fla. 1981); State ex rel. Lydick v. Brown, 516 P.2d 239, 240 (Okla. 1973); 
see also Henderson v. Maley, 806 P.2d 626, 634 (Okla. 1991). 
 37. These state concerns are similar to the concerns underlying the basic political 
question doctrine of justiciability as explained in Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962). See 
McIntyre v. Fallahay, 766 F.2d 1078, 1087-88 (7th Cir. 1985) (Swygert, J., dissenting). 
 38. See, e.g., In re Contest of the Election for the Offices of Governor and Lieutenant 
Governor Held at the Gen. Election on Nov. 2, 1982, 444 N.E.2d 170, 172 (Ill. 1983). 
432  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 29:425 
 
and a showing of probable success by the contestant even before the 
ballot boxes are opened and the contested ballots are subjected to re-
view.39 The contestant’s failure to make this showing can be a basis 
for dismissal of the election proceeding.40 
 In some states the courts will uphold the declared results unless 
there is clear and convincing evidence that the results are inaccurate 
and do not reflect the will of the people. Although state election con-
test statutes vary, most provide that the grounds for contesting an 
election are established when: (1) an election official has engaged in 
fraud or other illegal conduct; (2) illegal votes have been counted; (3) 
legal votes have been rejected or excluded; and (4) an election official 
has been bribed.41 Misconduct of an election official generally is an 
insufficient basis for a contest of the election result unless the illegal 
acts are substantial or intentional and affect the outcome of the elec-
tion.42 Similarly, the inclusion or exclusion of ballots is a basis for an 
election contest only if the contestant pleads and can show that the 
ballots in question were counted or excluded improperly and that 
these ballots are sufficient to alter the outcome of the election. Such 
a showing may exist as a threshold requirement for any election con-
test. 
 Remedies generally available for a court in an election contest are 
(1) to declare a winner of the election or (2) to order a new election. 
Some state courts are prohibited from changing the outcome of an 
election and are limited to declaring the election void and ordering a 
                                                                                                                    
 39. See id. at 175-77. 
 40. See, e.g., Gooch v. Hendrix, 851 P.2d 1321, 1327 (Cal. 1993) (“[A] primary princi-
ple of law as applied to election contests [is] that it is the duty of the court to validate the 
election if possible. That is to say, the election must be held valid unless plainly illegal.”); 
Swift v. Registrars of Voters, 183 N.E. 727, 728-29 (Mass. 1932); Christenson v. Allen, 119 
N.W.2d 35, 40 (Minn. 1963) (refusing to allow an election contest as a “fishing expedition”); 
Jackson v. Maley, 806 P.2d 610, 615 (Okla. 1991) (“[C]ourts indulge every presumption in 
favor of the validity of an election and, where possible, that validity will be sustained. Mere 
probabilities will not suffice to carry this initial burden.”) (citation omitted); In re Opening 
of Ballot Boxes, Montour County, 718 A.2d 774, 777 (Pa. 1998) (invalidating a recount be-
cause of a lack of verification of signatures on recount petition); Madigan Appeal, 253 A.2d 
271, 275 (Pa. 1969) (indicating that a showing that a partial recount of precincts discloses 
possible errors in other precincts is insufficient to obtain a recount of the other precincts in 
a state senate election). 
 41. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 102.168(3) (2000) (amended 2001); TEX. ELEC. CODE § 
221.003 (2000).  
 42. See, e.g., Fladell v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd., 772 So. 2d 1240 (Fla. 
2000) (concluding as a matter of law that the Palm Beach (butterfly) ballot did not consti-
tute substantial noncompliance with statutory requirements); Jacobs v. Seminole County 
Canvassing Bd., CV No. 00-2816 (Fla. 2d DCA Dec. 8, 2000) (rejecting a challenge to ab-
sentee balloting in Seminole and Martin Counties on the basis that plaintiffs’ evidence 
failed to support a finding of fraud, gross negligence, or intentional wrongdoing by election 
officials).  
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new election.43 In other states, the calling of a new election is avail-
able as a remedy only if the court is unable to determine who has 
won the prior election.44 At least two states have allowed votes to be 
added or subtracted from a candidate’s total based on an allocation 
formula.45 
 Although local general elections usually are subject to challenge 
through judicial election contests, a certified result in a statewide or 
multijurisdictional election often is subject to challenge only before 
designated legislative or executive officers. For example, any contest 
of a general election to the United States House of Representatives or 
Senate ultimately is resolvable only by those legislative bodies.46 
State recounts and possibly even state judicial election contests can 
proceed as a means of policing state election laws, so long as they do 
not interfere with the exclusive power of the respective houses of 
Congress to ultimately determine the election dispute.47 Similarly, in 
most states, state legislatures have exclusive authority to determine 
the outcome of any contest of the official results of a general election 
for membership in the state legislative body.48 In addition, many 
states have designated the state legislature or state officials other 
than the judiciary to decide contests of statewide elections.49 
 When entrusted with power to determine an outcome in an elec-
tion contest, these state50 and federal51 legislative bodies have fol-
                                                                                                                    
 43. See, e.g., Becker v. Pfeifer, 588 N.W.2d 913, 918 (S.D. 1999). Under South Dakota 
law, the court can only uphold the election as the free and fair expression of the will of the 
voters or declare the election void. Id. At least one state has allowed a new election appli-
cable only to one precinct or to certain specific voters previously denied the opportunity to 
cast a qualified ballot. See State ex rel. Olson v. Bakken, 329 N.W.2d 575, 579-82 (N.D. 
1983). 
 44. See, e.g., Green v. Reyes, 836 S.W.2d 203, 207 (Tex. App. 1992) (indicating that in 
Texas “[w]hen the court, with some degree of certainty, can determine the outcome of the 
election based upon the evidence presented by the parties, [state law] requires it do so”). If 
the alleged irregularity makes it impossible to determine the will of the voters, a court may 
call a new election. See, e.g., Marks v. Stinson, 19 F.3d 873, 879-89 (3d Cir. 1994). 
 45. See Canales v. City of Alviso, 474 P.2d 417, 421-22 (Cal. 1970) (subtracting illegal 
votes from the vote totals in a municipal consolidating election based on circumstantial 
evidence that illegal voters most likely voted for the proposition); In re The Purported Elec-
tion of Bill Durkin, 700 N.E.2d 1089, 1095 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998) (subtracting illegal votes 
from candidates by precinct according to the proportion of votes received by the candidate 
in the precinct). 
 46. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5; see also Roudebush v. Hartke, 405 U.S. 15, 19 (1972). 
 47. See Roudebush, 405 U.S. at 26 (allowing a statewide recount of votes for U.S. Sen-
ate so long as such state action does not interfere with the ability of the U.S. Senate to 
make a final determination in the dispute; the resulting recount reduced Hartke’s winning 
margin by only fifteen votes); Thorsness v. Daschle, 279 N.W.2d 166, 168-70 (S.D. 1979) 
(holding that the United States Constitution does not bar enforcement by the state courts 
of state procedures designed to insure the legal outcome of its elections). 
 48. See, e.g., TEX. ELEC. CODE § 221.002 (2000). 
 49. See, e.g., id. 
 50. See, e.g., Robert A. Junnell et al., Consideration of Illegal Votes in Legislative Elec-
tion Contests, 28 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1095 (1997). 
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lowed procedures akin to a judicial proceeding with an opportunity 
before a legislative committee for written submissions, evidence, and 
oral argument from the opposing candidates. In most states this 
power entrusted to legislative and executive officers is exclusive and 
is not subject to challenge in the state courts. 
 Primary elections pose a special problem for resolving election 
disputes.52 Outcomes must be final in time for inclusion of the win-
ning candidate on the general election ballot. Moreover, sometimes a 
primary election will not produce a winner and a runoff election is 
necessary. These severe time constraints have made contests difficult 
to prosecute. In most states the power to determine disputed primary 
elections is given to the local and state executive committees of the 
affected political party. In some states this power is exclusive. In 
other states the state courts retain the power to entertain a chal-
lenge to party primary elections. In each election scenario, a single 
judicial or administrative arbiter resolves disputes concerning voting 
irregularities or the inclusion or exclusion of votes from throughout 
the election district. Potential differences among local canvassing 
boards are resolved by this arbiter de novo in a contested proceeding 
by reference to the applicable standard set by state law. This re-
quirement for a single, ostensibly unbiased arbiter is an essential 
principle of fairness for resolving election contests. 
II.   A DISPUTED ELECTION OUTCOME 53 
 The polls closed in most of Florida at 7 p.m. Eastern time on No-
vember 7, 2000.54 Shortly thereafter, several national news organiza-
tions predicted that Gore would win Florida’s twenty-five electoral 
votes based on voter exit polls, turnout of voters at selected election 
precincts, and historical voting patterns.55 As the evening progressed, 
however, candidate Bush remained substantially ahead in the actual 
                                                                                                                    
 51. See Roudebush, 405 U.S. at 27 (Douglas, J., dissenting in part) (explaining that 
the United States Senate has established a custom of resolving disputes by allowing the 
apparent loser to allege the suspected voting irregularities and the votes affected; if the 
claim is not frivolous, the proceeding may involve the subpoena of ballots and the calling of 
witnesses to testify). 
 52. See Curry v. Baker, 802 F.2d 1302, 1304 (11th Cir. 1986) (considering a challenge 
to the authority of the Alabama Democratic Party Executive Committee to resolve dispute 
between candidates in the party primary). 
 53. This Article provides only a very brief and incomplete guide to some of the major 
events as background for its legal analysis. Many sources provide a more complete retell-
ing of the events in Florida. See, e.g., THE NEW YORK TIMES, 36 DAYS: THE COMPLETE 
CHRONICLE OF THE 2000 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION CRISIS (2001); THE WASHINGTON POST, 
DEADLOCK: THE INSIDE STORY OF AMERICA’S CLOSEST ELECTION (2001) [hereinafter DEAD-
LOCK].  
 54. Polls remained open in some counties in the western panhandle of Florida until 8 
p.m. Eastern time. DEADLOCK, supra note 53, at 35-36. 
 55. Id. at 35. 
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vote tally.56 News organizations began to reverse their earlier deci-
sion to call Gore the victor in Florida.57 By 2 a.m., it appeared that 
Bush had won Florida and the Presidency.58 At approximately 2:30 
a.m., Gore called Bush to express his intention to concede.59 
 Nevertheless, as interested officials of both campaigns and the 
general public watched in amazement, Bush’s lead in Florida shrank 
from 50,000 votes to fewer than 6,000.60 Gore called Bush to indicate 
that “circumstances had changed” and that he was no longer pre-
pared to concede.61 By sunrise on November 8, Bush’s lead in the un-
official vote tally in Florida had dwindled to 1,784, with the state’s 
electoral votes now clearly essential to both candidates for victory in 
the Electoral College.62 Lawyers from both campaigns were dis-
patched to Florida like troops in opposing armies, maneuvering for 
what was to become a gargantuan, chaotic legal and political battle 
over final certification of the winner of the state’s electoral votes.63 
The Presidency of the United States was the reward for the victor. 
 With approximately 6 million ballots cast in Florida, the miniscule 
difference between the two candidates automatically triggered a 
statewide recount.64 Most election officials conducted this automatic 
recount using the same counting equipment and procedures they 
used on election night, with ballots in counties using optical scanners 
and punch card electronic counting systems being rerun through the 
same machines.65 Nevertheless, the vote changed and by one unoffi-
cial count the margin between Gore and Bush had narrowed to 327 
votes after the recount tabulations from Florida’s sixty-seven coun-
ties were totaled on November 14.66 Some absentee ballots from over-
seas voters remained to be counted.67 Nevertheless, it was clear that 
the exclusion of some votes that had been counted or the inclusion of 
even a handful of votes from ballots that had not been counted could 
change the outcome of the election statewide. 
 Over the next several weeks, different categories of disputed bal-
lots would be identified. In hindsight, at least each the following 
categories of votes, or potential votes, existed on November 8 and 
                                                                                                                    
 56. Id. at 43. 
 57. Id. at 40. 
 58. Id. at 43-44. 
 59. Id. at vii. 
 60. Id. at 46-47. 
 61. Id. at 49. 
 62. Id. at 70. 
 63. Id. at 60-62, 65, 73. 
 64. See FLA. STAT. § 102.141(4) (2000) (amended 2001). 
 65. DEADLOCK, supra note 53, at 77. 
 66. According to the Associated Press tally on November 11, Gore gained 2,520 votes 
in the recount, while Bush gained 1,063 votes. This reduced the difference between the two 
candidates from 1,784 to 327. Id. at viii. 
 67. Id. at 99. 
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were subject to possible dispute in a manual recount or through legal 
proceedings in state or federal court: 
1. An estimated 110,000 ballots on which no vote was counted be-
cause the electronic counting equipment recorded votes on the bal-
lot for more than one presidential candidate (overvotes);68 
2. An estimated 43,000 to 70,000 ballots on which no vote for any 
presidential candidate was counted because the electronic counting 
equipment recorded no vote (undervotes);69 
3. Absentee votes in at least two counties (Seminole and Martin) 
where local election officials allowed Republican Party officials to 
correct absentee ballot applications after the applications had been 
received in the election official’s office;70 
4. Differences between the initial count and a second tabulation in 
Nassau County that produced 218 fewer votes, with a net gain of 
51 votes for Bush;71 
5. Overseas absentee ballots that were counted even though the 
envelopes containing the ballots failed to have the date post-
marked as required by state law;72 
6. Differences in the condition and type of voting equipment used 
by Florida counties that are alleged to have caused significant dis-
parities in the percentage of overvotes and undervotes among 
counties, with the highest percentage of uncounted ballots (primar-
ily overvotes) occurring in areas of the state with large African-
American or Caribbean-American neighborhoods;73 
                                                                                                                    
 68. More than 113,000 ballots included a vote for more than one presidential candi-
date, with approximately 104,000 including a vote for either Gore (75,000) or Bush 
(29,000). Ford Fessenden & John M. Broder, Study of Disputed Ballots Finds Justices Did 
Not Cast the Deciding Vote, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 12, 2001, at A1; Dan Keating & Dan Balz, 
Election 2000: Closer Than Close, WASH. POST, Nov. 11, 2000, available at 
http://stacks.msnbc.com/news/656172.asp#BODY. These overvotes included: (1) the result 
of the confusing butterfly ballot in Palm Beach County, which may have cost Gore ap-
proximately 8,000 votes; and (2) the two-page presidential ballot used in Duval County in 
which 20% of the presidential votes in predominately African-American precincts were 
thrown out as overvotes, thereby possibly costing Gore approximately 7,000 votes. Id. 
Other ballots treated as overvotes resulted from erasures or from voters apparently trying 
to be extra-clear in their choice by both voting for a candidate and writing in the name of 
the same candidate. Id. These latter categories of overvotes should have been counted un-
der Florida’s voter intent standard, but some counties, such as Lake and Escambia, did not 
check ballots rejected by the voting machines. The net gain by Gore from counting such 
ballots in these two counties alone would have been 329 votes. Id.  
 69. DEADLOCK, supra note 53, at xiv. 
 70. Id. at 159. 
 71. Id. at 158. 
 72. See David Barstow & Dan van Natta, Jr., How Bush Took Florida: Mining the 
Overseas Absentee Vote, N.Y. TIMES, July 15, 2001, at A1 (describing how Republican law-
yers, in coordination with Florida Secretary of State Katherine Harris, ostensibly were 
successful in adding a net of 739 votes for Bush from absentee ballots received, often with-
out postmarks, after November 7). 
 73. DEADLOCK, supra note 53, at 116-17; see Ford Fessenden, Ballots Cast by Blacks 
and Older Voters Were Tossed in Far Greater Numbers, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 12, 2001, at A17. 
Alleged racial discrimination during the election has been the focus of an investigation by 
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7. Ballots uncast because of the alleged intimidation of voters, 
primarily in African-American or Caribbean-American neighbor-
hoods;74 and 
8. Registered voters who remained ineligible on election day be-
cause they had not corrected an erroneous finding by state election 
officials that they had out-of-state felony convictions.75 
Numerous state or federal lawsuits were filed challenging these dif-
ferent categories of potential votes or alleged voting irregularities. I 
will focus, however, on the legal actions that largely deal only with 
the issues surrounding ballots that were recorded by the counting 
equipment as having no vote for any candidate for President (under-
vote) or as having a vote for more than one candidate for President 
(overvote). 
 Gore attorneys timely petitioned under state law for manual re-
counts of undervotes in only four of Florida’s sixty-seven counties. 
These requests were styled “protests” and were filed with the respec-
tive county canvassing boards as required by state law.76 These coun-
ties included Miami-Dade, Broward, Palm Beach, and Volusia. It 
soon became clear, however, that the manual recounts in three of 
these counties77 would not be completed by the statutory deadline of 
November 14 for reporting returns to the Secretary of State for 
canvassing and certification of a winner of the election. Several of 
                                                                                                                    
the United States Commission on Civil Rights. The Commission’s Report indicates that Af-
rican-American voters in Florida were more likely than white voters to have their ballots 
discarded. See generally UNITED STATES COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, VOTING IRREGULARITIES 
IN FLA. DURING THE 2000 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION (2001) [hereinafter VOTING 
IRREGULARITIES IN FLA.], available at www.usccr.gov/. The disparity was greatest in Duval 
County where over 20% of the ballots in predominately African-American precincts were 
disqualified because they contained votes for more than one presidential candidate. Id. ch. 
I, at 20-32; see also id. app. VII, at 10 (report by Allan J. Lichtman, The Racial Impact of 
the Rejection of Ballots in the 2000 Presidential Election in the State of Florida). The dis-
senting members of the Commission urge that this apparent disparity in the “spoilage 
rate” for ballots in predominately African-American precincts was not based on race but on 
factors such as a lower literacy rate and higher number of first time voters among the Afri-
can-American voters. Id. app. IX, at 3, 15-16 (report entitled The Florida Election Report: 
Dissenting Statement by Commissioner Abigail Thernstrom and Commissioner Russell G. 
Redenbaugh). The dissenting statement further suggests that if any “blame” is to be as-
signed, it should more appropriately go to the local election officials who designed the bal-
lots and purchased the voting machines rather than to Governor Bush or Secretary of 
State Harris. Id. app. IX, at 20-21. A “sample ballot” in Duval County urged voters to “vote 
all pages.” Id. ch. 8, at 7. It is likely that this instruction caused many of the first time vot-
ers in the African-American precincts of Duval County to cast a vote for Gore on page one 
of the ballot and another presidential candidate on page two. 
 74. DEADLOCK, supra note 53, at 158-59; see also VOTING IRREGULARITIES IN FLA., su-
pra note 73, chs. 2, 7. 
 75. DEADLOCK, supra note 53, at 158; see also VOTING IRREGULARITIES IN FLA., supra 
note 73, ch. 1, at 33-35; id. ch. 5. 
 76. See FLA. STAT. § 102.166(2) (2000) (amended 2001). 
 77. Volusia County completed its manual recount in time to meet the November 14 
deadline. The recount added a net of 98 votes for Gore. By the evening of November 14, 
Bush’s lead was down to 300 votes, with the overseas absentee ballots yet to be added. 
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these counties sought authority to later file amended returns that 
would include the results of the manual recounts. On November 15, 
Secretary of State Katherine Harris rejected the counties’ reasons for 
submitting amended returns after the statutory deadline and an-
nounced that she would certify the outcome in the presidential elec-
tion based only on the returns that had earlier been submitted to her 
by the counties on or before November 14 and the returns of overseas 
absentee ballots.78 
 The Florida Democratic Party and Al Gore filed actions in Leon 
County seeking to compel the Secretary of State to accept the 
amended returns.79 This action was consolidated with an earlier ac-
tion brought on behalf of Volusia County (in which Palm Beach 
County had intervened).80 The cases were certified by the District 
Court of Appeal to the Florida Supreme Court.81 The Florida Su-
preme Court, by order on Friday, November 17, enjoined the Secre-
tary of State from certifying the election results until further order of 
the court.82 After hearing oral argument, the court on November 21 
rejected any “hyper-technical reliance upon statutory provisions” and 
ordered the Florida Secretary of State to accept amended returns re-
ceived by 5 p.m. on Sunday, November 26.83 George Bush appealed 
this decision. On December 5, a unanimous United States Supreme 
Court agreed to vacate the order of the Florida Supreme Court and to 
remand the case for the Florida Supreme Court to clarify questions 
that could determine whether the case presented any federal ques-
tions within the jurisdiction of the nation’s highest Court.84 
 In the meantime, Bush’s lead had increased to 930 counted votes 
after inclusion of the absentee overseas ballots on November 18.85 
The deadline of November 26 set by the Florida Supreme Court for 
amended returns to be received by the Florida Secretary of State 
passed with only two of the four counties (Broward and Volusia) hav-
ing completed manual recounts.86 On the evening of November 26, 
George W. Bush was certified the winner of the Florida election. The 
                                                                                                                    
 78. Even Professor Epstein acknowledges that the Secretary of State “made the wrong 
choice in cutting off the recount so precipitously” but concludes that the decision was nev-
ertheless within the limits of her statutory power. Epstein, supra note 6, at 626. 
 79. See Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd. v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1220, 1227, 1240 
(Fla. 2000), vacated sub nom. Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd., 531 U.S. 70 
(2000) (per curiam). 
 80. Id. at 1227. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. at 1227, 1240. 
 84. Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd., 531 U.S. 70 (2000). 
 85. DEADLOCK, supra note 53, at x. 
 86. Palm Beach County completed its recount on November 26, but after the 5 p.m. 
deadline. Secretary of State Harris refused to accept either the partial recount or the late-
filed complete recounted returns. 
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certified result showed that he had won by 537 votes out of a total of 
approximately 6 million.87 Gore’s attorneys were now left with only 
the option of pursuing an election contest to challenge this certified 
result. An election contest was promptly filed in Leon County Circuit 
Court88 and was tried on December 3 and 4.89 Circuit Judge N. Sand-
ers Sauls denied Gore’s claims in the election contest.90 
 The stage was now set for the final battles before the Florida Su-
preme Court and the United States Supreme Court. Gore’s attorneys 
quickly appealed Judge Sauls’ ruling, and on December 8 the major-
ity opinion of a sharply divided Florida Supreme Court reversed 
Judge Sauls’ decision.91 The court ordered that the amended returns 
from Palm Beach County and the partially recounted returns from 
Miami-Dade County be added to the candidates’ totals.92 The addi-
tion of these amended returns reduced Bush’s lead to less than 193 
votes.93 The majority opinion further directed the circuit court on re-
mand to “tabulate by hand the approximate 9000 Miami-Dade bal-
lots, which the counting machine registered as non-votes, but which 
have never been manually reviewed,” and “to enter such orders as 
are necessary to add any legal votes to the total statewide certifica-
tions.”94 Gore supporters understandably were optimistic that a con-
tinuation of the recount would quickly produce additional votes suffi-
cient to overcome Bush’s miniscule lead. 
 Local election officials and political party representatives mobi-
lized throughout Florida. Attorneys for both candidates gathered be-
fore Leon County Circuit Court Judge Terry P. Lewis on the evening 
of December 8 to argue over how best to tabulate the ballots in Mi-
ami-Dade County and to count any uncounted legal votes elsewhere 
in the state. This count began on the morning of December 9 but 
ended soon thereafter when the United States Supreme Court stayed 
the order of the Florida Supreme Court.95 On December 12, a divided 
United States Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Florida 
Supreme Court and effectively brought the legal battle to an end, 
                                                                                                                    
 87. The final tallies were 2,912,790 votes for Bush and 2,912,253 for Gore. Barstow & 
van Natta, supra note 72. 
 88. See Complaint to Contest Election, Gore v. Harris (Fla. 2d Cir. Ct. Nov. 27, 2000) 
(No. 00-2808), available at http://199.44.225.4/courtDockets/pdf/election_cases/CV-00-
2808a.pdf. 
 89. See Gore v. Harris, No. 00-2808, 2000 WL 1770257 (Fla. 2d Cir. Ct. Dec. 4, 2000). 
 90. Id. at *1.  
 91. Gore v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1243 (Fla. 2000), rev’d sub nom. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 
98 (2000). 
 92. Id. at 1262. 
 93. Whether this difference was 193 or 154 votes depended on the outcome of a sepa-
rate dispute over the number of audited votes received by each candidate as a result of the 
recount in Palm Beach County. See id. at 1248 n.6. 
 94. Id. at 1262 (emphasis added). 
 95. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 1046 (2000).  
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making George W. Bush the certified winner of Florida’s twenty-five 
electoral votes and the winner of the Presidency.96 
III.   IN PARTIAL DEFENSE OF THE FLORIDA SUPREME COURT OPINIONS 
A.   Palm Beach County Canvassing Board v. Katherine Harris 
(Round One) 
 The Florida Supreme Court’s unanimous decision on November 21 
to extend the statutory deadline to allow amended election returns to 
be included in the final certified vote total was based on Florida 
law.97 The court found that the applicable state statutes conflicted in-
sofar as they set a timeframe for conducting a manual recount that 
was unworkable for the state’s most populous counties under the 
timeframe set for submitting county returns to the Secretary of 
State.98 
 The court determined that state law99 authorized local canvassing 
boards under certain circumstances to conduct a manual recount.100 
“[L]ogic dictates that the period of time required to complete a full 
manual recount may be substantial, particularly in a populous 
county, and may require several days.”101 Thus, the court reasoned, 
construing state law to require the results of these recounts to be 
filed with the Secretary of State within as little as one day after a 
timely request may be filed would create a conflict and effectively 
make manual recounts impossible, particularly in the largest coun-
ties. The court found that such a conflict was avoided because state 
                                                                                                                    
 96. See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000). 
 97. See 772 So. 2d 1220 (Fla. 2000), vacated sub nom. Bush v. Palm Beach County 
Canvassing Bd., 531 U.S. 70 (2000). 
 98. See FLA. STAT., §§ 102.111, 102.112(1) (2000) (amended 2001) (providing that re-
turns are to be filed with the Secretary of State by 5 p.m. on the seventh day following the 
election). 
 99. See id. § 102.166(4) (2000) (amended 2001) (authorizing a written request for a 
manual recount to be filed within seventy-two hours after midnight of the day the election 
was held). 
 100. The first issue resolved by the Court was whether local canvassing boards had au-
thority under state law to conduct a manual recount countywide in circumstances where a 
discrepancy of votes found in a sample manual recount of selected precincts exists for some 
reason other than incorrect election parameters in the vote tabulation software. See Palm 
Beach County Canvassing Bd. v. Harris, 772 So. 2d at 1229; see also FLA. STAT. § 
102.166(5) (2000) (amended 2001). Secretary of State Harris had indicated to Florida coun-
ties that a manual recount was allowed only if made necessary by fraud or substantial 
noncompliance with the state’s election procedures.  Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd. v. 
Harris, 772 So. 2d at 1238-39 (quoting a November 21, 2000, letter from Katherine Harris 
to the Palm Beach County Canvassing Board). The court concluded that an “error in vote 
tabulation” allowing a county canvassing board to conduct a countywide recount also in-
cluded circumstances in which the discrepancy between the original machine return and 
the sample manual recount is due to the manner in which the ballot has been marked or 
punched. Id. at 1228. 
 101. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd. v. Harris, 772 So. 2d at 1232. 
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law was ambiguous concerning the Secretary of State’s authority to 
reject late-filed returns. The applicable provisions setting the dead-
line for submitting returns had both mandatory and permissive lan-
guage. 
 Applying traditional rules of statutory construction102 and guided 
by the principle that the will of the people is the paramount consid-
eration,103 the court concluded that the Secretary of State’s authority 
to ignore amended county returns after the statutory deadline of No-
vember 14 was limited to circumstances that would compromise the 
integrity of the electoral process.104 The court then proceeded to de-
fine those circumstances for the present situation and to set a new 
deadline of November 27.105 
 Although controversial when issued, the supreme court’s opinion 
is consistent with Florida law and with the treatment of deadlines in 
other states where similar state statutory deadlines or requirements 
often are considered “directory” instead of “mandatory” when the 
statute itself does not clearly indicate a contrary legislative intent.106 
As the Florida Supreme Court recognized, disallowing a county’s 
more accurate amended election returns because of the possibly dila-
tory actions of a local canvassing board is a drastic penalty that 
“misses the constitutional mark.”107 
 Professor Richard Epstein faults the “sorry performance” of the 
Florida Supreme Court as justifying what he also acknowledges is a 
less than perfect performance by the United States Supreme Court.108 
He concludes that “there is ample reason to believe . . . that the Flor-
ida Supreme Court adopted, under the guise of interpretation, a 
scheme . . . that deviates markedly from that which the Florida legis-
lature had set out in its statutes.”109 Professor Epstein is particularly 
critical of the Florida Supreme Court’s attempt to impose its will on 
the state’s chief election officer, Secretary of State Katherine Har-
ris.110 
 According to Professor Epstein, the events leading to the decision 
in Bush v. Gore could have been avoided if the Florida Supreme 
                                                                                                                    
 102. Id. at 1234. The rules of statutory construction cited by the court include that (1) a 
specific statute controls over a general statute, (2) a more recently enacted statute controls 
an older statute, (3) a statutory provision should never be interpreted so as to render it 
meaningless, and (4) related statutory provisions must be read as a cohesive whole. Id. 
 103. Id. at 1236. 
 104. Id. at 1239. 
 105. Id. at 1240. 
 106. See, e.g., Wilks v. Mouton, 722 P.2d 187 (Cal. 1986). Even mandatory provisions of 
state law should be liberally construed to avoid thwarting the fair expression of the peo-
ples’ will. Id at 190; see also Timm v. Schoenwald, 400 N.W.2d 260, 263 (N.D. 1987). 
 107. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd. v. Harris, 772 So. 2d at 1240. 
 108. Epstein, supra note 6, at 635. 
 109. Id. at 634. 
 110. Id. at 634.  
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Court had properly followed the law as interpreted by Harris.111 Spe-
cifically, Professor Epstein urges that Harris was properly exercising 
her statutory authority by concluding that: (1) the county canvassing 
boards could not conduct manual recounts where a discrepancy be-
tween the original machine return and a sample manual recount is 
due to the manner in which a ballot has been marked or punched, 
and (2) Harris could refuse to accept amended returns after Novem-
ber 14 unless persuaded that the recounted numbers were correc-
tions of mathematical errors or the result of an election official’s sub-
stantial noncompliance with state law.112 
 Professor Epstein argues that manual recounts of ballots county-
wide in Florida were inappropriate because “[t]he reason we have 
machine counts is to guard against the risk of human error and 
bias.”113 He offers no authority for this position. It is correct that lev-
ered voting machines were first utilized at least partly in response to 
the fraud that accompanied the use of paper ballots in the nineteenth 
century.114 Also, hand counting of large numbers of paper ballots is 
generally considered to be less accurate than counting with machine-
readable ballots.115 Nevertheless, all electronic counting systems are 
vulnerable and susceptible to significant error.116 Usually this margin 
of error is not relevant for determining the outcome of an election be-
cause the recorded difference in votes among the candidates makes 
the will of the voters clear, even if the recorded number of votes for 
each candidate is somewhat imprecise. 
                                                                                                                    
 111. Id. Professor Epstein urges that the Florida Supreme Court erred because it was 
bound to defer to the legal interpretation given by Secretary of State Harris to the Florida 
statutes. Court deference to a government agency on issues of statutory interpretation is 
understandably less absolute than on issues of fact or matters of policy. Harris relied on 
essentially legal interpretations of state statutes as a basis for refusing to accept amended 
county tallies. This tactic left her decisions susceptible to court challenge on the basis that 
her interpretations were contrary to the law. The Florida Supreme Court agreed with this 
challenge. See Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd. v. Harris, 772 So. 2d at 1228.  
 112. Epstein, supra note 6, at 622. Professor Epstein’s description of the Secretary of 
State’s position is somewhat more thoughtfully worded than the actual position taken by 
Katherine Harris for rejecting amended returns. In her November 15 letter to the canvass-
ing board in Palm Beach County, Harris essentially adopted the state’s case law applicable 
to a court’s review of certified results in an election contest and used it to create a burden 
of proof for county canvassing boards. She concluded that she was justified in rejecting 
amended returns unless the county canvassing boards alleged fraud or substantial non-
compliance with state law and could show more than a mere “possibility” that the amended 
returns could affect the outcome of the election. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd. v. 
Harris, 772 So. 2d at 1226 n.5 (quoting the November 15 letter from Katherine Harris to 
the Palm Beach County Canvassing Board). Although, as discussed elsewhere, such a bur-
den of proof exists for a contestant in an election contest and would affect Gore’s success 
before Judge Sauls, the Florida Supreme Court was correct in finding that such reasons 
were inapposite for rejecting amended returns from government canvassing boards. 
 113. Epstein, supra note 6, at 625. 
 114. SALTMAN, supra note 10. 
 115. Id. at 26. 
 116. Id. at 25-51. 
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 Virtually all states provide by law for some means of manually re-
counting ballots in circumstances in which the candidate vote totals 
from the electronic counting machines are near equal.117 An attempt 
on election night to manually count and to record votes in multiple 
races from thousands of ballots could result in substantial human er-
ror. A manual recount of machine-counted ballots, however, gener-
ally is limited to only one race and takes place in a strictly regulated 
process designed to ensure that the interests of all candidates are 
protected and that the most accurate count possible is achieved. The 
Florida Supreme Court was almost certainly correct that, as in most 
other states, manual recounts are an available means by which a lo-
cal canvassing board can attempt to identify and to correct errors in 
the machine counting of ballots. 
 Professor Epstein also argues that if manual recounts of ballots 
countywide were possible under Florida law, “the sole function of the 
hand recount is to examine ballots to see whether they meet the 
standards for a ballot that is machine-readable.”118 This position 
greatly oversimplifies a complex legal issue. If a ballot is machine-
readable, the votes on the ballot will have been recorded by the ma-
chine. Any variation in a manual count tabulation from that of a ma-
chine count necessarily results from the human decisionmaker con-
cluding that a ballot contains a legal vote even when the electronic 
counting machine failed to record the vote. In each of the four coun-
ties in Florida in which a manual recount was conducted, the mem-
bers of the recount committees found at least some ballots that they 
agreed had clearly ascertainable but unrecorded votes. This is likely 
to be true in any manual recount of punch card or optical scan paper 
ballots. Therefore, the controlling issue in Florida and other states 
during a manual recount is not whether such ballots are machine-
readable. Instead, the issue is whether the ballot contains a legal 
vote under state law.119 If the vote is legal, it should be counted. Any 
failure to include such ballots is subject to challenge in an election 
contest. 
 The issue of what constitutes a legal vote differs according to the 
laws of the various states. In virtually all states, a legally cast bal-
                                                                                                                    
 117. See 2001 ELECTION ADMIN. SURVEY, supra note 9; see, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 102.166 
(2000) (amended 2001); TEX. ELEC. CODE § 214.042 (2000). 
 118. Epstein, supra note 6, at 623. 
 119. Professor Epstein correctly points out that it is the Florida Secretary of State who 
by law is responsible for at least initially providing guidance on what constitutes a valid 
vote under Florida law. Id. at 624. In many states, the state’s chief elections officer has 
promulgated rules to provide guidance for discerning a legal vote during a manual recount. 
See, e.g., TEX. ELEC. CODE § 214.042 (2000). Florida in 2000 had no such guidelines. In-
stead of furnishing such guidelines after the 2000 election, Secretary of State Harris took 
official positions that at the time appeared designed to prevent a manual recount alto-
gether. 
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lot120 is to be counted according to the “intent of the voter” even if a 
vote has not been recorded for the ballot by the voting machine.121 If a 
ballot has been legally cast, courts have been reluctant to leave it un-
counted when the ballot reflects the voter’s intent to cast a vote for a 
particular candidate and that specific vote has later become crucial 
to the election or defeat of that candidate.122 The Supreme Court of 
Florida cited the decision of the Illinois Supreme Court in Pullen v. 
Mulligan for the explanation that “[t]o invalidate a ballot which 
clearly reflects the voter’s intent, simply because a machine cannot 
read it, would subordinate substance to form and promote the means 
at the expense of the end.”123 The Florida Court’s decision to permit 
the manual counting of ballots by local canvassing boards to discern 
voter intent when such votes may affect the outcome of an election is 
consistent with Florida law and with the approach adopted by state 
courts nationwide. 
 In his concurring opinion in Bush v. Gore, Chief Justice Rehnquist 
urged that ballots that cannot be read by a counting machine be-
cause of the manner in which the ballots have been marked or 
punched are a result of “voter error” and are “improperly marked bal-
lots” that the Florida Secretary of State could appropriately refuse to 
include in the state’s certification of results.124 In regard to punch 
card ballots, the asserted voter error generally is seen as a failure by 
the voter to fully or effectively comply with the instruction125 to check 
her ballot after voting and to clear any “chips” hanging from the back 
                                                                                                                    
 120. State courts will disallow votes that are cast illegally even though the ballot is 
machine-readable. This issue occurs in many contexts, such as a voter’s nonresidency, in-
eligibility to vote in the primary of another party, or failure to comply with requirements 
for voting absentee. Even in the case of ballots cast in violation of a state’s absentee voting 
laws, however, some courts have permitted the votes to be counted on the basis that the 
error was not attributable to the voter and that to disallow the vote would unfairly disen-
franchise the voter. 
 121. See, e.g., Delahunt v. Johnston, 671 N.E.2d 1241, 1243 (Mass. 1996) (indicating 
that “if the intent of the voter can be determined with reasonable certainty from an inspec-
tion of the ballot . . . [then] effect must be given to that intent”) (citing Pullen v. Mulligan, 
561 N.E.2d 585, 611 (Ill. 1990); McIntyre v. Wick, 558 N.W.2d 347, 359 (S.D. 1996) (indi-
cating that when marks on a ballot are sufficiently plain to gather therefrom a part of the 
voter’s intent, there is a duty to count the ballot); see also Partido Nuevo Progresista v. 
Perez, 639 F.2d 825 (1st Cir. 1980) (permitting courts of Puerto Rico to count ballots con-
taining marks outside the designated spaces on the ballot); Duffy v. Mortenson, 497 
N.W.2d 437 (S.D. 1993) (finding chad sufficiently dislodged on one ballot after subjecting 
disputed ballots to examination by “stereoscope”). 
 122. See, e.g., Duffy, 497 N.W.2d at 439. 
 123, Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd. v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1220, 1238 ( Fla. 2000), 
vacated sub nom. Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd., 531 U.S. 70 (2000) (citing 
Pullen, 561 N.E.2d at 611). 
 124. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 118-119 (2000) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).  
 125. This instruction does not amount to a legal requirement sufficient to disqualify a 
ballot. 
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of the card.126 Chief Justice Rehnquist cautioned that “[n]o reason-
able person would call it ‘an error in the vote tabulation’ or a ‘rejec-
tion of legal votes’ when electronic or electromechanical equipment 
performs precisely in the manner designed, and fails to count those 
ballots that are not marked in the manner that these voting instruc-
tions explicitly . . . specify.”127 
 The real world operates somewhat differently than seemingly en-
visioned by Chief Justice Rehnquist. Voters, in the rush of casting 
their vote, routinely fail to check their ballots afterward and fail to 
completely knock out any chips or chad that may remain attached to 
a punch card ballot. Does the disqualifying “voter error” occur at this 
moment, when a voter fails to adequately comply with the instruc-
tions, or later when the machine fails to record the vote? This dis-
tinction is important because loosened chad remaining on the ballots 
after the vote is cast routinely are cleared purposely or knocked in-
advertently from punch card ballots throughout the counting process 
by election workers during handling of the punch cards. The counting 
machines themselves dislodge significant quantities of loosened chad 
during the machine count. In fact, experts concede that it is generally 
not possible to duplicate a machine count obtained on prescored 
punch cards because chad continues to become detached on each oc-
casion that the punch cards are machine-counted.128 Apparently, no 
state tries to disqualify voters because they fail to clear chad from 
their ballot. Nor do states attempt to discriminate between voters 
based on whether the chad on a punch card ballot is removed by the 
voter, or is later knocked off during the counting process, or remains 
by chance attached after the machine count. It is very unlikely that 
the Florida Legislature intended such discrimination or would apply 
the same standard differently to the same ballot. 
 Concern over the possibility that participants in an administra-
tive recount might apply different standards or apply the same stan-
dard differently to the same ballot is justified. The events in Florida 
clearly demonstrate how different canvassing boards or members of 
the same canvassing board may reach different conclusions regard-
ing voter intent. The Florida Supreme Court decision in Palm Beach 
                                                                                                                    
 126. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 119 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring) (quoting Florida In-
struction); see Epstein, supra note 6, at 632. 
 127. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 119 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring) (statutory citations 
omitted). At least one state court (Massachusetts) has expressly rejected this argument on 
the basis that while voters sometimes could perhaps do a better job of expressing them-
selves, ballots should not automatically be disqualified because of a failure to comply 
strictly with announced procedures. See Delahunt v. Johnston, 671 N.E.2d 1241, 1243 
(Mass. 1996). 
 128. See SALTMAN, supra note 10, at 35. In Florida, the automatic machine recount or 
retabulation statewide immediately following the election resulted in 3,583 additional 
votes, with Gore gaining a net of 1,784 votes. 
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County Canvassing Board v. Harris does not purport to decide how 
voter intent should be discerned; nor, however, does it find that 
variations in how local canvassing boards determine legal votes are 
immune from challenge in an election contest. It is during an election 
contest that irregularities in counting “legal votes” can be challenged 
and corrected. This issue is discussed further below. In sum, how-
ever, I believe the Florida Supreme Court correctly decided Palm 
Beach County Canvassing Board v. Harris. 
B.   Albert Gore v. Katherine Harris (Round Two) 
 The Florida Supreme Court’s Gore v. Harris decision on December 
8 is much more problematic than its earlier decision in Palm Beach 
County Canvassing Board v. Harris. Gore v. Harris reached the court 
by appeal from Leon County Circuit Judge Sanders Sauls’ decision to 
reject Al Gore’s election contest complaint.129 Three opinions by dif-
ferent members of the Florida Supreme Court reflect a sharp division 
over the applicable law and the appropriate role of a court in fashion-
ing relief under the circumstances that existed on December 8. A ma-
jority of four justices reversed the circuit court and ordered it to in-
clude the votes for Gore from the recounts in Palm Beach and Miami-
Dade counties and enter such orders as necessary to add any legal 
votes statewide to the candidates’ totals.130 Three justices dissented 
generally on the basis that Gore had failed to carry his burden at 
trial as a plaintiff in the election contest and that no adequate rem-
edy could be fashioned in the time remaining if Florida’s presidential 
electors were to be selected by December 12, as contemplated by 3 
U.S.C. § 5.131 
 On December 12, in Bush v. Gore, the United States Supreme 
Court reversed the Florida court’s ruling. Bush v. Gore also reflects a 
sharply divided Court. The Court’s per curiam opinion found four 
problems with the Florida Supreme Court order under the Four-
teenth Amendment requirement of equal protection. These were as 
follows: 
1. The Florida court’s order permitted inconsistent treatment, both 
among counties and within counties, in the determination of which 
ballots would count as legal votes in a manual recount;132 
                                                                                                                    
 129. See Gore v. Harris, CV No. 00-2808, 2000 WL 1770257 (Fla. 2d Cir. Ct. Dec. 4, 
2000).  
 130. Gore v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1243, 1248 (Fla. 2000), rev’d sub nom. Bush v. Gore, 
531 U.S. 98 (2000). 
 131. Id. at 1268-70 (Wells, C.J., dissenting); see also id. at 1270-72 (Harding, J., dis-
senting). 
 132. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 106. The concern in the per curiam opinion that stan-
dards for accepting or rejecting ballots during a recount might vary “not only from county 
to county but indeed within a single county from one recount team to another,” id. at 106, 
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2. The Florida court’s order permitted the inclusion of overvotes in 
some counties while not providing for a recounting of these ballots 
in other counties;133 
3. The Florida court’s order permitted inclusion of a partial re-
count from Miami-Dade County and failed to guarantee that re-
counts must be complete in order to be included in any final certi-
fied result;134 and 
4. The Florida court’s order failed to provide a satisfactory process 
for counting the votes, or even providing who would recount the 
ballots.135 
At least six of the Justices of the United States Supreme Court joined 
in finding that the Florida court’s remedial order violated equal pro-
tection.136 
 The United States Supreme Court’s per curiam opinion in Bush v. 
Gore correctly identified very significant problems that could have 
arisen under the Florida Supreme Court’s remedial plan for counting 
votes in the presidential election. Even those Justices who most vig-
orously dissented from the United States Supreme Court’s decision 
expressed understandable concern over the degree of unequal treat-
ment of votes and voters possible under the Florida court’s remedial 
                                                                                                                    
is misplaced. Disputes over how ballots are counted within specific manual recount teams 
are resolved by the canvassing board. In turn, differences among counties are subject to 
challenge through an election contest. 
 133. Id. at 107-08. 
 134. Id. at 108. 
 135. Id. at 109. 
 136. The per curiam opinion indicated that “[s]even Justices of the Court agree that 
there are constitutional problems with the recount ordered by the Florida Supreme Court 
that demand a remedy.” Id. at 111. In a separate concurring opinion, Chief Justice 
Rehnquist was joined by Justices Scalia and Thomas in challenging both the November 21 
and December 8 decisions of the Florida court as infringing on the power of and the statu-
tory scheme prescribed by the Florida Legislature. Id. at 122 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring). 
Justice Stevens, in a dissenting opinion joined by Justices Ginsburg and Breyer, found no 
substantial federal question that would entitle the Court to reverse the Florida court’s de-
cision. Id. at 123-29 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Writing separately in a dissenting opinion in 
which she was joined by Justices Stevens and Breyer, Justice Ginsburg agreed that the 
Court lacked jurisdiction and further disputed the conclusion that a constitutionally ade-
quate recount is impractical. Id. at 135-44 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). In a separate dissent-
ing opinion, Justice Souter agreed with the per curiam that the Florida Supreme Court or-
der violated equal protection, but he concluded that the state courts should be afforded an 
opportunity to establish uniform standards for counting ballots and should be given an op-
portunity to try to manually recount all disputed undervotes before the applicable federal 
deadlines. Id. at 129-35 (Souter, J., dissenting). Justice Breyer’s separate dissenting opin-
ion is less clear about whether he believes the Fourteenth Amendment had been violated, 
as he explained his agreement with the per curiam’s concerns in terms of how the dispari-
ties in the recount “implicate principles of fundamental fairness.” Id. at 145 (Breyer, J., 
dissenting). Justice Breyer would have permitted the Florida recount to continue under 
uniform standards. Id. at 158 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
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order.137 Importantly, however, the Florida Supreme Court’s majority 
opinion did not expressly condone unfair or unequal treatment. The 
opinion directed the circuit judge to “enter such orders as are neces-
sary to add any legal votes to the total statewide certifications.”138 
 The problems raised by the Justices of the United States Supreme 
Court in the context of the Fourteenth Amendment are precisely the 
type of legal and procedural questions that customarily are resolved 
through the adversarial process present in any state election contest. 
As suggested by Justice Souter, the Florida courts might well have 
eventually dealt with the use of differing substandards for determin-
ing voter intent in different counties employing similar systems if 
given the opportunity to do so.139 
 Rather than a holding that unequal treatment in an election con-
test is acceptable under the state or federal constitutions, the major-
ity opinion of the Florida Supreme Court is a product of the extraor-
dinary circumstances in which the court found itself on December 8. 
Some of the difficulties faced by the court were apparent at the 
time,140 including the brief period of time it had to decide complex le-
gal issues. The majority opinion further recognized that “practical 
difficulties may well end up controlling the outcome of the elec-
tion.”141 Despite these difficulties, a majority of the Florida court re-
solved to “do the best we can.”142 The court’s majority opinion reflects 
that ambitious, but mistaken, effort. 
 One frequent criticism of the majority opinion is misplaced. Sev-
eral commentators have urged that an election contest is in the na-
                                                                                                                    
 137. Id. at 126 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (admitting that “the use of differing substan-
dards for determining voter intent in different counties employing similar voting systems 
may raise serious concerns”). 
 138. Gore v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1243, 1262 (Fla. 2000), rev’d sub nom. Bush v. Gore, 
531 U.S. 98 (2000) (emphasis added). 
 139. In the view of Justice Stevens, the traditional safeguard for election contests na-
tionwide existed even under the Florida court’s remedial order—i.e., “a single impartial 
magistrate [that] will ultimately adjudicate all objections arising from the recount proc-
ess.” Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 126 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 140. The court, however, also faced less obvious difficulties created by the attorneys for 
the opposing parties. Secretary of State Harris opposed any manual count of votes and 
therefore offered no expert suggestions as to how the Court might proceed to manually 
count all legal votes in the state. The attorneys for Gore were so focused on obtaining an 
immediate addition of the votes from Palm Beach and Miami-Dade Counties and a count of 
the remaining 9,000 uncounted votes in Miami-Dade that they prosecuted the election con-
test on flawed legal theories before the circuit court and failed to provide either an ade-
quate trial record or a legally sound remedial plan. On the other hand, the attorneys for 
Bush were essentially uninterested in aiding the Florida court in finding a remedy for the 
various disparities in treatment that the attorneys had identified. Bush was best served on 
appeal to the United States Supreme Court by an incomplete and insufficient opinion from 
the Florida Supreme Court. 
 141. Gore v. Harris, 772 So. 2d at 1261 n.21. 
 142. Id. 
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ture of a judicial review of an administrative decision.143 If this were 
true, the standard of review would be abuse of discretion.144 State law 
nationwide, however, treats an election contest as an independent 
judicial action specially authorized by statute. Circuit Judge Sauls 
applied an abuse of discretion standard to find that the Miami-Dade 
County board had not abused its discretion by deciding not to count 
the remaining 9,000 undervotes.145 The majority opinion of the Flor-
ida Supreme Court in Gore v. Harris rejected this holding.146 While 
dissenting from the remainder of the majority opinion, Justices 
Harding and Shaw also expressly rejected Circuit Judge Sauls’ find-
ing on the standard of judicial review because he “improperly inter-
twined [the recount protest and election contest] and the standards 
applicable to each.”147 The commentators have made the same mis-
take. Once a judicial election contest is commenced, it is the court 
that is charged with deciding if legal votes have been excluded or il-
legal votes included.148 Cases challenging proceedings before a can-
vassing board, such as attempts to compel a board to conduct a re-
count,149 are inapposite to an election contest. 
 Nevertheless, the majority decision in Gore v. Harris is wrongly 
decided. The majority correctly identified the conflicting principles—
“the necessity for counting all legal votes” to effect the will of the 
electorate and the ultimate need for finality.150 The majority, how-
ever, weighed these principles incorrectly when it concluded that “we 
must do everything required by law to ensure that legal votes that 
have not been counted are included in the final election results.”151 
This decision was inconsistent with election law in Florida and else-
where for four reasons. 
 First, the decision is mistaken because it essentially put the court 
in the position of trying to fashion a remedy despite Gore’s failed le-
gal strategy. It was Circuit Judge Sauls who first found that the bur-
                                                                                                                    
 143. See Epstein, supra note 6, at 630-31; McConnell, supra note 6, at 668-69. 
 144. Epstein, supra note 6, at 630-31. 
 145. Transcript: Judge N. Sanders Sauls Rules Against Gore’s Contest, at 3 (Dec. 4, 
2000) (copy on file with the Florida State University Law Review) [hereinafter, Transcript]. 
 146. Gore v. Harris, 772 So. 2d at 1252. 
 147. Id. at 1270 (Harding, J., dissenting). 
 148. See id. at 1271 (Harding, J., dissenting) (indicating that the issue of whether a 
canvassing board has rejected a number of legal votes sufficient to change or to place in 
doubt the election by virtue of cutting short a manual recount is to be determined de novo, 
not under an abuse of discretion standard); see also McIntyre v. Wick, 558 N.W.2d 347, 358 
(S.D. 1996) (describing the scope of review in an election contest as de novo). But see id. at 
1265. (Wells, C.J., dissenting) (concluding that the contest and protest statutes must be 
read together).  
 149. See, e.g., Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd. v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1220 (Fla. 
2000), vacated sub nom. Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd., 531 U.S. 70 (2000); 
Broward County Canvassing Bd. v. Hogan, 697 So. 2d 508, 510 (Fla. 1992). 
 150. Gore v. Harris, 772 So. 2d at 1261. 
 151. Id. 
450  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 29:425 
 
den on Gore in the election contest was “to place in issue and seek as 
a remedy with the attendant burden of proof a review and recount of 
all ballots in all counties in this state with respect to the particular 
alleged irregularity or inaccuracy in the balloting or counting proc-
esses alleged to have occurred.”152 Gore’s failure to meet this burden 
should have been determinative of the outcome in the election con-
test regardless of any policy favoring the counting of all votes or ef-
fecting the will of the voters. While not upholding Sauls’ dismissal of 
the election contest, the majority agreed “that it is absolutely essen-
tial in this proceeding and to any final decision, that a manual re-
count be conducted for all legal votes . . . in all Florida counties 
where there was an undervote and, hence a concern that not every 
citizen’s vote was counted” and that the election should not be de-
cided “by strategies extraneous to the voting process.”153 By remand-
ing the election contest for a count of uncounted legal votes state-
wide, the majority was effectively attempting to save Gore from his 
own losing strategy. This was not justified. 
 The court’s second mistake was its finding that a number of non-
votes exceeding the difference between two candidates was sufficient 
under section 102.168, Florida Statutes, to obtain a count of those 
ballots in an election contest. Significant numbers of nonvotes exist 
in every election. Only a fraction of such nonvotes are legal votes un-
der even the most liberal standard for discerning voter intent. More-
over, net votes gained by a losing candidate from a manual counting 
of nonvote ballots in one county or precinct may be offset by votes 
gained by her opponent from a manual counting of nonvote ballots in 
other counties or precincts. Manually counting ballots throughout 
the county, district, or state in question is time-consuming, costly, 
and potentially chaotic. It is necessary to make a threshold showing 
that rejected legal votes exist sufficient to change or to place in doubt 
the outcome of an election. This threshold is not met by a mere show-
ing that there are more nonvotes in one county or precinct than there 
are votes separating the two candidates.154 
                                                                                                                    
 152. Transcript, supra note 145 (emphasis added). 
 153. Gore v. Harris, 772 So. 2d at 1253. 
 154. The presence of 9,000 uncounted ballots in Miami-Dade County does not meet the 
burden of showing that sufficient rejected legal votes existed to change the outcome or to 
place in doubt the outcome of the presidential election in Florida. Testimony offered by 
Gore at trial was inadequate even to show that the 9,000 ballots remaining to be manually 
counted in Miami-Dade County contained sufficient net votes for Gore to overcome Bush’s 
lead. Gore’s expert witness, Professor Nicolas Hengartner, on direct examination testified 
only as to the “recovery rate” of valid votes that could occur with a manual recount of the 
uncounted ballots. Contest Hearing R. at 176-92, Gore v. Harris, CV No. 00-2808 (Fla. 2d 
DCA Dec. 6-7, 2000). Gore’s petition alleged that, if a manual count of the 9,000 votes re-
sulted in the same proportional increase in net votes as the ballots already counted by the 
Miami-Dade Canvassing Board, Gore would gain a net of 600 votes. Id. (R. at 326). Profes-
sor Hengartner, however, offered no testimony directly supporting this projection. The Re-
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 A third fundamental mistake by the majority was its failure to re-
alize that the desire to count every vote had been eclipsed by the 
need for finality. The Illinois Supreme Court faced a very similar di-
lemma in 1983 when the certified results of a statewide race for Gov-
ernor and Lieutenant Governor showed a difference of 5,074 votes 
out of 3,627,128 cast for the Democratic and Republican candidates 
for the these state offices.155 The Democratic candidates, Adlai E. 
Stevenson, Jr., and Grace Mary Stern, filed an election contest. In 
their petition, they claimed that after reviewing designated precincts 
in 70 out of 102 counties they had discovered alleged irregularities 
that would increase their net vote by 4,664 votes.156 Moreover, they 
pointed to thousands of ballots allegedly lacking the requisite initials 
of the election judge or bearing identifying marks made by the voter 
that would render those ballots illegal. In rejecting the petition, the 
Illinois Supreme Court pointed to the insufficiency of the pleadings 
and to the expense and burden of conducting the election contest. 
The court further explained: 
Until such an election contest is resolved, the political turmoil sur-
rounding it and the fact that it will be unknown in this case 
whether the incumbent governor will continue to hold that office 
could effectively prevent the legislative and executive branches of 
government from dealing with the urgent problems facing this 
State. The State of Illinois should not be forced to endure these con-
sequences on the mere suspicion of defeated candidates or on their 
belief or hope that an election contest would change the results.157 
 This decision brought an abrupt end to an important statewide 
election contest without resolving precisely which candidates re-
ceived the greatest number of legal votes. 158 Sometimes the desire to 
                                                                                                                    
publican expert witness, Dr. Laurentius Marais, countered that the projection of a gain in 
Gore votes from the uncounted votes in Miami-Dade County was “unreliable and inaccu-
rate” because it was based on the false premise that the proportion of votes for Gore would 
be the same for the ballots that remained to be manually counted. Id. (R. at 326-27). Dr. 
Marais pointed out that the precincts that had been manually recounted in Miami-Dade 
had voted greater than 75% for Gore while the remaining precincts had voted 52% for 
Bush. Id. (R. at 327). He concluded that there was no basis for projecting from the heavily 
Democratic precincts to the remaining precincts. Id. Subsequent manual counts by the 
media of all undervote ballots in Miami-Dade County have shown that Bush would have 
gained net votes from a manual recount of the 9,000 uncounted undervotes. Fessenden & 
Broder, supra note 68. 
 155. In re Contest of the Election for the Offices of Governor and Lieutenant Governor 
Held at the General Election on Nov. 2, 1982, 444 N.E.2d 170, 172 (Ill. 1983). 
 156. Id. at 179-80. 
 157. Id. at 178 (emphasis added).  
 158. Predictably, three judges dissented from this ruling. Id. at 183 (Ward, J., dissent-
ing). These justices claimed that the majority’s requirement for specificity in pleading in an 
election contest means “the candidate must do, in practical terms, the impossible” because 
she must accumulate sufficient evidence in fifteen days from 102 counties to show that she 
will win the election. Id. at 189 (Ward, J., dissenting). The dissenting judges further chal-
lenged the majority’s practical arguments by indicating that “[o]ur society does not fix af-
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count every vote and to be absolutely certain of the will of the voters 
must, in the absence of fraud, ultimately yield to the essential need 
for finality.159 This point was reached in Florida in the presidential 
election.160 By December 8 there was no reasonable possibility that a 
continuation of the election contest could result in a fair, credible re-
sult within a reasonable time. Four justices of the Florida Supreme 
Court were unwilling to accept this reality. 
 Finally, in its effort to achieve a count of undervotes statewide in 
the inadequate time available, the majority of the Florida Supreme 
Court abandoned the principles that are fundamental to a fair re-
count and election process and to an accurate outcome—that is, an 
adequate opportunity for candidates to identify alleged voting irregu-
larities during the counting process and, in a contested proceeding, to 
have any disputed issues resolved before a single impartial arbiter. 
The most egregious example is the majority’s direction that the cir-
cuit court must include the additional votes for Gore from the man-
ual counts in Miami-Dade and Palm Beach Counties. It was clear 
from the record that these ballots had been counted using differing 
standards for determining voter intent and that these standards in 
turn might very well be different from the standards used elsewhere 
in the state during the court-supervised manual review and counting 
of undervotes. Issues of arbitrary and disparate treatment of ballots 
in the other counties in the statewide count of nonvotes might theo-
retically have been resolved in time through court supervision in a 
contested judicial proceeding. However, the order that the circuit 
court include the Palm Beach and Miami-Dade votes for Gore in the 
                                                                                                                    
fordable expense as a standard for doing justice or, in particular, for insuring the integrity 
of the electoral process.” Id. at 191 (Ward, J., dissenting). 
 159. An important aspect of our democracy is that power in government can readily 
transfer in confidence that, at the end of the term of office, it will again transfer if the elec-
tion outcome is different. No outcome of any single primary or general election is suffi-
ciently important to warrant significant disruption of the governing process, even in the 
interest of assuring the accuracy of the election outcome. There must be finality. The can-
didates, but more importantly the government and the people, must move on. See McIntyre 
v. Fallahay, 766 F.2d 1078, 1088 (7th Cir. 1985) (Swygert, J., dissenting) (indicating that 
our government is a representative democracy and that the people cannot be properly rep-
resented unless the legitimacy and authority of the elected official to represent them is fi-
nally determined). 
 160. Federal courts long have recognized an analogous principle of withholding a rem-
edy when “exigent circumstances” justify conducting an election under an unlawful elec-
tion system, or allowing the results of an election under an unlawful system to remain un-
changed. Even as it gave federal courts the task of remedying unconstitutional state ap-
portionment of legislative districts, the U.S. Supreme Court in Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 
533, 585-87 (1964), explained that federal courts may be bound to award or to withhold re-
lief based on the mechanics and complexities of state election laws. This principle has been 
applied many times since 1964. See, e.g., Upham v. Seamon, 456 U.S. 37, 44 (1982); Ely v. 
Klahr, 403 U.S. 108 (1971); Kilgarlin v. Hill, 386 U.S. 120, 121 (1967); Terrazas v. 
Clements, 537 F. Supp. 514, 537 (N.D. Tex. 1982) (three-judge panel), stay denied, 456 U.S. 
902 (1982). 
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candidate’s vote total despite a lack of uniform counting 
substandards essentially mandated a disparity in the treatment of 
ballots. Moreover, this determination suggested to the circuit court 
that fairness and accuracy in other vote counts could have been sacri-
ficed for the sake of expediency.161 While I do not believe that the 
Florida Supreme Court intended any unfairness, its December 8 or-
der both directly and implicitly created the possibility for a result in-
consistent with the law of Florida and with the fundamental princi-
ples of fairness followed in election contests nationwide. 
 The United States Supreme Court assessed that the recount proc-
ess underway in Florida in the wake of Gore v. Harris “was probably 
being conducted in an unconstitutional manner.”162 As a result, the 
Court stayed the order of the Florida Supreme Court directing the 
recount.163 In its subsequent opinion in Bush v. Gore, the Court con-
cluded that “upon due consideration of the difficulties identified to 
this point, it is obvious that the recount cannot be conducted in com-
pliance with the requirements of equal protection and due process 
without substantial additional work.”164 
 Those who urge that the recount process should have been al-
lowed to proceed under the Florida Supreme Court’s remedial order, 
or under a new order providing uniform rules for the recount, under-
estimate the legal task faced on December 9 and both the number 
and complexity of the legal disputes that remained to be resolved. 
The many parties to the Gore election contest already had filed nu-
merous motions pending ruling by the circuit court and were certain 
                                                                                                                    
 161. As the Gore attorneys on remand before Judge Lewis pushed for an expedited re-
count, the already questionable legal status of the election contest deteriorated rapidly. In 
the interest of time, (1) the ballots manually counted in Broward and Palm Beach Counties 
were to be included in the vote total without any further review, (2) the partial recount 
that had already been completed by the Miami-Dade County Board of approximately 20 
percent of the county’s undervote ballots would be left unchanged while the remaining bal-
lots from the county would be counted by a new group of examiners, and (3) the undervotes 
in the remaining counties would be counted by the officials of those counties. No rules were 
established for use by these different counting groups. Also in the interest of time, Judge 
Lewis barred party observers from objecting during the manual counting process, although 
the observers could keep a list of disputed ballots that might serve as a basis for objections 
later. In effect, these procedures created a certainty that ballots would be counted accord-
ing to the subjective judgment of many different persons without adequate provision for an 
adjudication of disputed ballots or issues by a single impartial arbiter. This publicized and 
broadcast proceeding suggested that a rush existed to count ballots in a seemingly arbi-
trary or haphazard fashion. This impression available through the media probably con-
tributed to concerns at the United States Supreme Court that the situation was out of 
hand. 
 162. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 109 (2000). 
 163. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 1046 (2000). 
 164. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 110. 
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to file many more.165 The Florida Supreme Court decision left the cir-
cuit court the task of initially determining at least the following: 
1. The mechanics of the expedited statewide recount (for example, 
whether ballots should be manually reviewed and votes counted by 
local canvassing boards or all ballots should be shipped to Leon 
County and reviewed and counted by the circuit judge or under his 
supervision); 
2. The logistics of the recount process (for example, the qualifica-
tions of the counters, the possible lack of personnel to conduct the 
count, the fatigue of the counters, and intracounty personnel is-
sues among the state’s sixty-seven counties); 
3. The procedures to be utilized to assure the opportunity of the 
candidates’ representatives to observe the recount process and to 
obtain a judicial resolution of disputes; 
4. The categories of ballots to be reviewed to discern voter intent 
(for example, only ballots with undervotes, or also ballots with 
overvotes as challenged by the Bush attorneys); 
5. The counties to be included in the recount (for example, only un-
counted votes in counties using punch cards or also nonvote ballots 
in counties using other voting equipment); 
6. The standards, if any, required to be used by the counters in 
manually reviewing ballots for voter intent; 
7. Whether to manually review federal write-in ballots and to in-
clude them in the statewide tabulation even though not fully com-
pliant with state law; 
8. The merit of any challenges to the manually counted votes from 
Broward, Miami-Dade and Palm Beach Counties based on the use 
in those recounts of different standards than might be used for the 
remainder of Miami-Dade County and the state; 
9. The number of the 9,000 undervote ballots from Miami-Dade 
County that constituted uncounted legal votes and the candidate 
for whom the voter intended to cast her ballot; 
10. The resolution of disputes concerning the approximately 
175,600 nonvotes statewide that could contain a legal vote; and 
11. Whether it would be necessary to manually count all 6 million 
votes cast statewide in the presidential race to determine if any 
machine-counted votes should be disallowed because the presence 
of “hanging chad” or “dimpled chad” for a second candidate indi-
cates that the ballot is in fact an overvote. 
                                                                                                                    
 165. See Docket Sheet, Gore v. Harris, CV No. 00-2808 (Fla. 2d Cir. Ct. 2000), available 
at http://www.clerk.leon.fl.us/election_cases.html. Opposing parties in election contest liti-
gation frequently dispute everything from the jurisdiction of the court and the standing of 
the contestant, to the admission of evidence, to every alleged irregularity in voting and 
every disputed vote that potentially can be included or excluded from the final tally. The 
parties in Gore v. Harris were different only in the greater number and magnitude of such 
disputes. 
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All such determinations were disputed166 and necessarily raised sub-
stantial questions of fairness and legality in the context of a judicial 
proceeding that could effectively declare a winner of the Presidency 
of the United States.167 Judge Lewis attempted to initially address 
some of these issues in an expedited fashion without proper opportu-
nity for briefing, oral argument, or the submission of evidence.168 
Fairly counting nonvotes in an election contest could come only in a 
protracted proceeding.169 The presidential electors from Florida could 
not have been timely determined170 through a legally sufficient elec-
tion contest even if the Florida Supreme Court’s December 8 reme-
dial order had been left undisturbed by the United States Supreme 
Court.171 
                                                                                                                    
 166. Transcript of Motions Hearing, Gore v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1243 (Fla. 2000) (No. 
SC00-2431), available at http://www.clerk.leon.fl.us/election_cases [hereinafter Transcript 
of Motions Hearing]. The motions hearing commenced at 8:35 p.m. and concluded at 11:39 
p.m. 
 167. Technical problems, such as the ability to identify uncounted ballots, remained 
unsolved. See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 108 (indicating that any manual recount of only a 
portion of the ballots would require a reprogramming of the voting tabulation equipment to 
screen out undervotes; the distinct possibility existed under the Florida Supreme Court’s 
order that a statewide recount would be impossible to accomplish and that the circuit court 
could be asked to declare a winner on the basis of an admittedly incomplete recount). 
 168. See Transcript of Motions Hearing, supra note 166, at 59-65 (ruling of the Court). 
The ruling set in place procedures designed to begin the counting of “nonvotes or under-
votes” immediately in all counties that had not previously conducted a manual review of 
such ballots. Legal issues, such as what constituted a legal vote, remained unsettled.  
 169. Historically, even relatively simple local election contests have taken months to 
resolve, sometimes requiring numerous hearings, appeals, and recounts of the same bal-
lots. For example, appellate courts have been called upon to physically examine each con-
tested ballot in an election contest to determine if the lower court has applied a correct 
standard. See, e.g., McIntyre v. Wick, 558 N.W.2d 347 (S.D. 1996). The prospect of the Flor-
ida Supreme Court or the United States Supreme Court possibly being asked to manually 
examine and to count thousands of disputed ballots on appeal is mind-boggling but not 
unlikely in a circumstance in which the inclusion or exclusion of only a few hundred votes 
could have determined the Presidency of the United States.  
 170. Merely manually examining the more than 170,000 nonvote ballots in a manner 
designed to assure fair and uniform treatment would have taken significant time and 
might not have yielded a convincing result. The ballot review project commissioned by 
eight media organizations began to organize its review of uncounted ballots in January 
2001. Ford Fessenden, How the Consortium of News Organizations Conducted the Ballot 
Review, N. Y. TIMES, Nov. 12, 2001, at A17. The counting of ballots began in February and 
was completed in May. The results were available by September but were not released un-
til November. The consortium utilized 153 ballot examiners. The consortium also benefited 
by avoiding the possibility of distractions caused by contesting attorneys and parties. Nev-
ertheless, the review of ballots by the consortium took months and reached only inconclu-
sive results given the various possible definitions of voter intent. Id. 
 171. The per curiam opinion of the United States Supreme Court indicated: 
it is obvious that the recount cannot be conducted in compliance with the re-
quirements of equal protection and due process without substantial additional 
work. It would require not only the adoption (after opportunity for argument) of 
adequate statewide standards for determining what is a legal vote, and practi-
cable procedures to implement them, but also orderly judicial review of any 
disputed matters that might arise. 
Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 110 (emphasis added). 
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 The United States Supreme Court effectively brought the Gore 
election contest to a close in a manner similar to which other much 
less monumental contests have been ended by state courts on the 
practical effects of upcoming elections.172 The perceived need for fi-
nality came to outweigh any need for absolute accuracy in the elec-
tion outcome. Time, if it was ever sufficient, simply ran out. Three 
justices of the Florida Supreme Court would have ended the contest 
for these same reasons on December 8.173 It became the justifiable 
burden of a majority of the United States Supreme Court to do so 
three days later.174 
IV.   THE PRECEDENTIAL SIGNIFICANCE OF BUSH V. GORE 
A.   Requirements for Equal Protection 
 Although several writers have suggested that the decision in Bush 
v. Gore provides an advancement in voting rights,175 other contribu-
tors to this symposium have correctly questioned this conclusion, 
pointing out that the per curiam opinion itself indicates that “consid-
eration is limited to the present circumstances.”176 One writer has 
cautioned that the decision will be of little precedential value because 
the Court itself did not take its holding seriously or engage in serious 
legal analysis.177 Moreover, this same writer notes that the holding in 
Bush v. Gore constitutes a strong break from the conservative major-
ity’s usual approach to equal protection issues.178 
 The per curiam opinion in Bush v. Gore explains the scope of its 
holding as follows: 
                                                                                                                    
 172. For example, as a practical matter it often is impossible to fully adjudicate re-
counts or election contests in party primary or runoff elections because candidates must be 
determined in adequate time to be placed on the runoff or general election ballot and to 
campaign for election. 
 173. Chief Justice Wells of the Florida Supreme Court explained in his dissenting opin-
ion on December 8 that “it is inescapable that there is no practical way for the contest to 
continue for the good of this country and state.” Gore v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1243, 1269 (Fla. 
2000) (Wells, J., dissenting), rev’d sub nom. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000). Justice Hard-
ing, joined by Justice Shaw, similarly concluded in his dissent that the majority of the 
Florida Supreme Court was attempting to provide a remedy which would be “impossible to 
achieve” and which would “ultimately lead to chaos.” Id. at 1273 (Harding, J., dissenting).  
 174. Constitutional scholars correctly point out that there is a dearth of precedent for 
the application of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Florida Supreme Court’s remedial or-
der interpreting and applying Florida state law. My experience as a practitioner, however, 
gave me a different perspective. I was not surprised that a majority of the U.S. Supreme 
Court was unwilling to permit the Presidency of the United States to potentially be deter-
mined by a fundamentally flawed state remedial order. A lack of precedent for federal 
court intervention in such a circumstance is no insurmountable barrier. 
 175. See, e.g., Issacharoff, supra note 3; Sunstein, supra note 6, at 769 (“On its face, the 
Court appears to have created the most expansive voting right in many decades.”). 
 176. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 109. 
 177. See, e.g., Hasen, supra note 5, at 387-90. 
 178. Id. at 390. 
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 The recount process, in its features here described, is inconsis-
tent with the minimum procedures necessary to protect the fun-
damental right of each voter in the special instance of a statewide 
recount under the authority of a single state judicial officer. Our 
consideration is limited to the present circumstances, for the prob-
lem of equal protection in election processes generally presents 
many complexities. 
 The question before the Court is not whether local entities, in 
the exercise of their expertise, may develop different systems for 
implementing elections. Instead, we are presented with a situation 
where a state court with the power to assure uniformity has or-
dered a statewide recount with minimal procedural safeguards.179 
Importantly, the Supreme Court’s per curiam opinion limits its scope 
to a remedial order of a judicial officer having authority to ensure 
uniformity in a statewide recount. By doing so, the opinion expressly 
limits itself to election contest types of proceedings. There is nothing 
in the opinion to suggest that it establishes a new equal protection 
requirement for statutes governing the recount structure, procedure, 
or standards of a state’s election process. In fact, the express wording 
of the opinion as quoted above appears to be intended to avoid impli-
cating state and local control of elections. 
 Read literally, the per curiam opinion holds only that a remedial 
order in a judicial election contest proceeding must assure “rudi-
mentary requirements of equal treatment and fundamental fair-
ness”180 for resolving disputes over the counting of votes throughout 
the election jurisdiction in question. Nothing is novel in this declara-
tion. A contrary concept would have been shocking. The function of 
an election contest before a single judicial officer or court is to con-
sider alleged irregularities that might affect the outcome of the elec-
tion and to resolve disputes regarding the alleged inclusion of illegal 
votes or exclusion of legal votes in a uniform manner. 
 State courts historically have insisted on fairness and equal 
treatment of voters and ballots in an election contest without need-
ing to rely on the Fourteenth Amendment or even explicitly on com-
parable provisions of state constitutions.181 These state law princi-
                                                                                                                    
 179. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 109 (emphasis added). 
 180. Id. 
 181. See, e.g., In re Issue 27 Election of Nov. 4, 1997, 693 N.E.2d 1190 (Ohio 1998) (dis-
allowing recount where manual counts by board of only the votes “for” a municipal proposi-
tion produced an increase in votes sufficient to change the outcome). The court reasoned 
that if irregularities (i.e., “hanging chad”) affected votes for the proposition, it was incum-
bent on the canvassing board to inspect the “no” votes as well. Id. The canvassing author-
ity has the duty to ensure a fair and accurate recount. Id. at 1192-93; Greenwood Town-
ship Election Case, 25 A.2d 330, 332 (Pa. 1942) (revoking certification of recount on finding 
that erasures had caused invalidation of ballots in one precinct and ordering a check for 
similar tampering in fifteen other precincts); McIntyre v. Wick, 558 N.W.2d 347 (S.D. 
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ples of fairness have the same implications in the context of an elec-
tion contest as those that arise from requirements of equal protec-
tion under Bush v. Gore.182 It was the majority of the Florida Su-
preme Court that strayed from these principles.  
B.   Discerning Voter Intent 
 The per curiam opinion in Bush v. Gore indicates: 
Florida’s basic command for the count of legally cast votes is to 
consider the “intent of the voter.” This is unobjectionable as an ab-
stract proposition and a starting principle. The problem inheres in 
the absence of specific standards to ensure its equal application. 
The formulation of uniform rules to determine intent based on 
these recurring circumstances is practicable and, we conclude, nec-
essary.183 
This statement is made in the context of the recount of punch card 
ballots and a per curiam opinion limited to an election contest type 
of proceeding. 
 Significantly, the per curiam opinion does not suggest that the 
guiding principle in vote counting—discerning voter intent—is in-
appropriate.184 Therefore, the voter intent principle prescribed by 
law in virtually all states is not directly threatened by the Bush v. 
Gore decision. The per curiam opinion does indicate, however, that 
“[t]he formulation of uniform rules to determine intent based on 
these recurring circumstances is practicable and, we conclude, nec-
essary”185 and that the “search for [the voters’] intent can be con-
fined by specific rules designed to ensure uniform treatment.”186 It is 
unclear whether the Court meant these conclusions to apply beyond 
the context of a judicial election contest type of proceeding. Never-
theless, whether required or not, rules or guidelines for discerning 
voter intent with punch card and other electronic counting systems 
are advisable in any circumstance in which ballots may be manually 
                                                                                                                    
1996) (challenging the inconsistent methods by which certain types of ballots (straight 
party ballots) were counted in different counties within a state legislative district). 
 182. Federal courts also have relied on fundamental fairness. See, e.g., Griffin v. 
Burns, 570 F.2d 1065 (lst Cir. 1978) (overturning Rhode Island Supreme Court decision as 
fundamentally unfair in interpreting state law to not allow counting of absentee ballots in 
a primary election). 
 183. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 105-06 (citation omitted). 
 184. Several of the contests in Congress have involved an effort by a house of that body 
to discern voter intent on ballots. For example, in 1925, the U.S. Senate ordered 900,000 
ballots transported to Washington, D.C., in a dispute over the election of a senator from 
Iowa; the dispute centered on ballots allegedly counted or thrown out based on “extrane-
ous” marks on the ballots. See H.R. REP. No. 99-58 (1985) (providing in disputed congres-
sional election for the counting of all ballots from which the intent of the voter may be dis-
cerned without regard to technicalities). 
 185. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 106. 
 186. Id. 
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reviewed either before187 or after being machine-counted. Many 
states have been operating under such rules existing either in stat-
ute or through regulations or guidelines promulgated by the state’s 
election officer.188 
 Even when rules or guidelines are present, the ultimate standard 
often remains the intent of the voter. For example, section 127.130 
of the Texas Election Code was suggested in Florida as an example 
of an instance in which state law established specific rules for de-
termining what constitutes a vote without relying on the standard of 
“voter intent” as used by the Florida courts. Subsection (d) of section 
127.130 indicates that a vote on a punch card ballot “may not be 
counted unless: (1) at least two corners of the chad are detached, (2) 
light is visible through the hole, [or] (3) an indentation on the chad 
from the stylus or other object is present and indicates a clearly as-
certainable intent of the voter to vote.”189 The subsection goes on, 
however, to qualify these rules by allowing an exception when “the 
chad reflects by other means a clearly ascertainable intent of the 
voter to vote.”190 The section further subsumes all of these more spe-
cific substandards within the “intent of the voter” standard by ex-
pressly indicating that nothing in subsection (d) supersedes “any 
clearly ascertainable intent of the voter.”191  
 This Texas statute reflects the practical reality that it is not pos-
sible to fully prescribe rules for controlling a determination of voter 
intent because the difficulties in ascertaining voter intent are not 
limited to only punch card systems or to certain identifiable circum-
                                                                                                                    
 187. Some states review ballots before machine processing to determine if ballots have 
been mismarked and may not be read accurately by the counting machine. See, e.g., N.D. 
CENT. CODE § 16.1-15-09 (2001). Machine-readable duplicate ballots are prepared accord-
ing to the voter’s intent shown on the original ballot. The original ballots are maintained so 
that they can be examined if necessary in a later manual recount or contest.  
 188. See 2001 ELECTION ADMIN. SURVEY, supra note 9. The National Commission of 
Election Standards and Reform adopted a series of preliminary recommendations on April 
22, 2001. Essentially, the Commission recommended that elections remain under state and 
local control with federal regulatory control. See National Association of Counties, COUNTY 
NEWS, May 7, 2001, at 1-3. The Commission indicates that the federal government can 
best address the weakness of the system by funding improvements in equipment and ad-
ministration, sponsoring research, and disseminating information. Id. The Commission 
had been created in January, 2001, by the National Association of County Officials 
(NACO). Id. In addition to recommendations for funding, the Commission recommended 
that states: (1) determine what constitutes a vote for each type of equipment; (2) establish 
clear recount procedures; (3) work to remove partisanship by election officials; and (4) pro-
vide adequate time to complete a canvas of an election prior to any recount or contest. Id. 
Most state legislation efforts at reform in 2001 failed. Id. at 2. 
 189. TEX. ELEC. CODE ANN. § 127.130(d)(1)-(3) (Vernon 2000) (emphasis added). 
 190. Id. § 127.130(d)(4). 
 191. Id. § 127.130(e). 
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stances.192 For example, reports from Florida have contrasted the ap-
parent accuracy of an optical scanner for discerning a voter’s intent 
to vote as compared to the equipment counting punch card ballots. 
Nevertheless, federal government reports warn that ballots can be 
unreadable in optical scanners even when the voter’s intent is clearly 
ascertainable from the ballot by manual examination.193 It appears 
likely that many of the ballots treated as nonvotes in Florida’s optical 
scan counties would have been recognized as votes through a manual 
recount.194 
 Even when rules exist for discerning voter intent, objective and 
reasonable counters may disagree on the application of those stan-
dards to particular ballots. For example, in Delahunt v. Johnston195 
the Supreme Court of Massachusetts found that the judge of the 
trial court had applied the correct standard for discerning voter in-
tent but that “[o]n balance, we are slightly more willing to find an 
intention expressed on [the] ballots where the trial judge ruled there 
was none.”196 
 Just as different umpires in baseball call balls and strikes differ-
ently at the extremes of the prescribed strike zone, different judicial 
and administrative officials may include or exclude votes from ballots 
left uncounted by counting equipment even when such decisions are 
subject to controlling rules. Statutory or administrative rules are de-
sirable for discerning the intent of voters with a manual review of 
ballots. The decision in Bush v. Gore properly places an emphasis on 
the utility of such rules. Nevertheless, even with such rules, subjec-
tive judgments are unavoidable. The safeguard under election cir-
cumstances is that any irregularities in how votes are counted ulti-
                                                                                                                    
 192. The potential for failing to accurately record voter intent exists under any voting 
system. The potential for error varies according to many factors, including the type and 
condition of the counting equipment. 
 193. See SALTMAN, supra note 10, at 37. 
 194. For example, the Orlando Sentinel reported that Gore would have picked up a net 
increase of 203 votes in Orange County if the undervote ballots left uncounted by the 
county’s optical scanning equipment had been manually counted. Roger Roy & Mike Grif-
fin, Orange Tally Nets 203 Votes for Gore, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Feb. 10, 2001, at A1. This 
undercount problem with optical scanners in Florida is consistent with the experience of 
other states such as Texas, where 0.63 percent of the ballots in counties using optical 
scanners for the 2000 election were found to have nonvotes for President. See Texas Secre-
tary of State Henry Cuellar, Report to the Texas Legislature (January 2001) (on file with 
the Florida State University Law Review). By comparison, the new Direct Record Elec-
tronic (DRE) systems in Texas had an even higher percentage of 0.89 percent of under-
votes. Id. 
 195. 671 N.E.2d 1241, 1243 n.2 (Mass. 1996); see also Duffy v. Mortenson, 497 N.W.2d 
437, 439-40 (S.D. 1993) (concluding that a ballot with indented chad not counted by the 
trial court provides evidence of clear voter intent and, when counted, results in a tie be-
tween the candidates). 
 196. Delahunt, 671 N.E.2d at 1243 n.2. 
2001]                         COUNTS, RECOUNTS, CONTESTS 461 
 
mately are reviewable by a single impartial arbiter through an elec-
tion contest. 
C.   The Single Impartial Arbiter 
 The essential requirement for equal and fair treatment is the 
presence of a fair adversarial process before a single, impartial arbi-
ter with responsibility for adjudicating contested issues and deter-
mining whether the election result reflects the will of the voters. As 
Justice Stevens recognized, the Supreme Court’s concerns in Bush v. 
Gore that different county canvassing boards used differing stan-
dards for determining voter intent should have been alleviated, if not 
eliminated, “by the fact that a single impartial magistrate will ulti-
mately adjudicate all objections arising from the recount process.”197 
If time had permitted a prosecution of the Gore election contest in 
Florida courts on a normal time frame, it is likely that those adver-
sarial proceedings would have eventually prevented the disparities 
identified by the United States Supreme Court. It is because of the 
extraordinary circumstances that existed on December 8 that the 
Florida Supreme Court’s majority opinion strayed so far from assur-
ing the fairness required in an election contest. 
 State laws generally provide that recounts, including manual re-
counts, in state and federal elections are ultimately subject to resolu-
tion before a single magistrate, appellate court, state officer, or insti-
tution with authority to resolve disputes or to adjudicate contested 
issues. Recount disputes in an election for a subcounty or county of-
fice are initially resolved by the local canvassing board or recount 
committee with authority to determine what ballots should lawfully 
be included or excluded for precincts within the entire jurisdiction. 
The judicial election contest provides a check on the exercise of this 
authority by making the outcome of the election subject to de novo 
challenge before a single impartial arbiter subject to appellate re-
view. 
 State or federal laws also provide such an arbiter for multicounty 
and statewide elections. The specific officer, court, or institution var-
ies among the states and according to the elective office in question. 
For example, federal elections for Congress are initially subject to po-
tentially disparate local recount procedures or practices, but it is 
Congress itself that ultimately has authority to resolve any contested 
issues, including the inclusion or exclusion of disputed ballots from 
throughout the election jurisdiction. Congress has exercised this au-
thority on several occasions in the past through an adversarial proc-
ess in which committees conduct hearings, consider evidence, and 
                                                                                                                    
 197. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 126 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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recommend a ruling by the affected legislative body.198 State legisla-
tive elections similarly are often subject to local recounts, but it is the 
state legislative bodies that ultimately act to resolve contested is-
sues. These state institutions also generally act through adversarial 
proceedings with an opportunity for briefs, hearings, and the presen-
tation of evidence. As in Congress, this process occurs before a com-
mittee that then makes recommendations to the affected legislative 
body.199 
 For nonlegislative, multicounty, or statewide elections, the states 
have created numerous differing alternatives for adjudicating con-
tested issues affecting the outcome of a general election. For exam-
ple, in Texas an election contest over a state office, such as Governor, 
is resolved by the state legislature.200 Curiously, an election contest 
over presidential electors in Texas is decided after an evidentiary 
hearing by the Governor.201 In other words, if Texas law had been 
applicable in Florida in 2000, it would have been Jeb Bush who 
would have been designated by statute to hear the Gore election con-
test. 
 Primary elections present a particular problem because they are 
intraparty affairs and because there is limited time available be-
tween a primary election and a general election to resolve disputes in 
time to assure that the winning person in the primary appears as the 
party’s candidate on the general election ballot.202 Since local gov-
ernment election officials generally are responsible for conducting 
such primary elections, recounts occur in a similar although some-
times expedited basis. Contests, on the other hand, may end up in 
state court or before local or state political party officials or commit-
tees. 
 State and federal laws effectively provide a single arbiter with au-
thority to adjudicate disputes over the counting of ballots. Combined 
with the opportunity for candidates and their partisan representa-
tives to observe recounts, the availability of a single arbiter provides 
a means for achieving fairness and uniformity in the counting of bal-
lots despite the possibility of some initial disparity among county 
governments. 
                                                                                                                    
 198. ANNE M. BUTLER & WENDY WOLFF, U.S. HISTORICAL OFFICE, UNITED STATES 
SENATE: ELECTION, EXPULSION AND CENSURE CASES 1793-1990 (1995). On several occa-
sions the U.S. Senate has subpoenaed all ballots for manual review in Washington, D.C. As 
might be expected in such circumstances, a determination regarding the inclusion or ex-
clusion of particular ballots or categories of ballots became a partisan fight. Id. 
 199. Junnell, supra note 50, at 1095. 
 200. TEX. ELEC. CODE ch. 242 (2000). 
 201. Id. ch. 243. 
 202. Often the issue in a general primary is a determination of whether a runoff elec-
tion may be required and which candidates qualified for the runoff. The need for a runoff 
further shortens the time for resolution of recounts and election contests. 
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 There is not, however, any universally accepted means for assur-
ing that this final arbiter is impartial. Decisions left to state or fed-
eral legislative bodies, or possibly to the Governor of a state, may, as 
shown by the events in Florida, become viewed as partisan rather 
than impartial decisions. The recent experience in Florida also 
shows, however, that circumstances can occur under which not even 
the highest courts of a state or of the nation are above suspicion by 
some as acting for partisan reasons in an election dispute. 
V.   GORE’S LOSING LEGAL STRATEGY 
 It is very possible that there is nothing that Albert Gore could 
have done after November 7 to prevail as the certified winner of Flor-
ida’s presidential electors. Bush might have prevailed under any re-
count or election contest scenario simply because he had the most 
votes. Or, Bush might have prevailed because the combination of a 
Republican Governor, a Republican-controlled state legislature, a 
Republican chief state election officer, and ultimately a U.S. Su-
preme Court dominated by persons identified with the Republican 
Party may ultimately have been too much for Gore to overcome re-
gardless of whether he received the most votes. Nevertheless, the le-
gal strategy followed by the Gore attorneys significantly lessened 
Gore’s opportunity to prevail.203 
 The fundamental flaw in Gore’s legal strategy beginning Novem-
ber 8 was its failure to appreciate the difference in law and dynamics 
between an administrative recount of votes and an election contest. If 
the necessary uncounted votes were there, an appropriate recount 
could find them. If the campaign was left to pursuing an election con-
test, however, the chances of success were essentially nonexistent in 
the time available before the deadlines set by federal law for the se-
lection of presidential electors. 
 This difference between a vote recount and an election contest was 
not readily apparent on examination of the relevant Florida statutes. 
The election contest provisions of section 102.168, Florida Statutes, 
appeared seductively simple. They expressly acknowledged the “re-
jection of a number of legal votes sufficient to change or place in 
doubt the result of the election”204 as a ground for an election contest 
                                                                                                                    
 203. I admit as a trial attorney that I am reluctant to offer these critical comments 
about the legal strategy followed by the Gore legal team in Florida. The Gore legal team 
was outstanding. Nevertheless, if the strategies of Lee at Gettysburg and Napoleon at Wa-
terloo are susceptible to reevaluation in light of the outcome in those battles, then it would 
also seem appropriate to subject Gore’s strategy in Florida to reevaluation. Despite my 
admiration for the attorneys in question, I believe that the flaws in the Gore strategy ex-
isted at least in part because those outstanding attorneys lacked experience in the world of 
election administration, recounts, and the litigation of election contests. 
 204. FLA. STAT. § 102.168(3)(c), (2000). 
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and authorized the circuit court judge to “fashion such orders as he 
or she deems necessary.”205 It is reasonable on the face of this statute 
to expect that a showing by Gore of almost any number of potentially 
uncounted votes (much less the 9,000 or more undervotes in Miami-
Dade County) would have led to a counting of enough undervotes to 
erase the miniscule Bush lead. Based on this assumption about sec-
tion 102.168, success in the administrative recount process before the 
local canvassing boards, while desirable, was not essential to Gore’s 
eventual triumph. 
 The apparent promise of section 102.168, however, was illusory. 
As in other states, Florida courts historically have been reluctant to 
interfere in elections, particularly to overturn a certified election out-
come.206 Therefore, as in other states, the Florida courts have created 
a presumption in favor of the validity of the certified results and evi-
dentiary burdens for a contestant to overcome that do not necessarily 
appear on the face of the contest statute.207 At a minimum, Gore had 
to prove that legal votes had been excluded and that, if included, 
these legal votes would change or place in doubt the outcome of the 
election itself, based on the inclusion or exclusion of votes statewide, 
not just in selected counties. Moreover, even simple local election 
contests generally are marked by intense legal battles. Given the im-
                                                                                                                    
 205. Id. § 102.168(8) (amended 2001). 
 206. This reluctance was evident even in 2000 in the Florida Supreme Court’s rejection 
of challenges to the outcome of the presidential election based on the Palm Beach County 
butterfly ballot and the absentee balloting in Seminole and Martin Counties. See infra note 
207. 
 207. In his dissent in Gore v. Harris, Chief Justice Wells explained that “Historically, 
this Court has only been involved in elections when there have been substantial allega-
tions of fraud and then only upon a high threshold because of the chill that a hovering ju-
dicial involvement can put on elections.” 772 So. 2d 1243, 1263 (Fla. 2000) (Wells, C.J., dis-
senting); see, e.g., Smith v. Tynes, 412 So. 2d 925 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982) (indicating that it is 
not enough for a contestant to show a reasonable possibility that election results could be 
altered by irregularities, rather a reasonable probability that the results would have been 
changed must be shown). This threshold of “reasonable probability” was created by the 
Florida courts and did not appear explicitly in the election statutes. See also Boardman v. 
Esteva, 323 So. 2d 259, 268 (Fla. 1975) (indicating that where the record does not show 
that votes were illegal “the presumption of the correctness of the election officials’ returns 
stands”); Krivanek v. Take Back Tampa Political Comm., 625 So. 2d 840, 844-45 (Fla. 
1993) (quoting Boardman v. Esteva, supra, for the proposition that “[i]t is certainly the in-
tent of the constitution and the legislature that the results of elections are to be efficiently, 
honestly and promptly ascertained by election officials to whom some latitude of judgment 
is accorded, and that courts are to overturn such determinations only for compelling rea-
sons when there are clear, substantial departures from essential requirements of law”). In 
Gore v. Harris, the majority of the Florida Supreme Court concluded that the “reasonable 
probability” standard was no longer applicable under section 102.168 as amended in 1999. 
772 So. 2d at 1255. Dissenting Justices Harding and Shaw agreed with the majority that 
the reasonable probability requirement had not survived the 1999 amendments. Id. at 
1271 (Harding, J., dissenting). Nevertheless, these two justices concluded that section 
102.168 still required a contestant to show “that the number of legal votes rejected by the 
canvassing boards is sufficient to change or place in doubt the result of this statewide elec-
tion” and that Gore had failed to carry this burden. Id. (emphasis in original). 
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portance of this particular election, it was safe to assume on Novem-
ber 8 that any election contest would be a monstrous, complex, and 
chaotic affair with multiple parties and myriad legal issues. Realisti-
cally, no candidate was likely to win such a contest in the time avail-
able. 
 Therefore, success in the recount was Gore’s only opportunity af-
ter November 7 to prevail in the election. The automatic statewide 
recount produced 1,753 additional net votes for Gore. State law pro-
vided a means of obtaining a further recount, including a manual re-
count of the nonvote ballots, through the protest process. Although 
this process was certain to be vigorously contested, it was an estab-
lished procedure bound by a deadline that would expire before presi-
dential electors were to be selected or would cast their ballots. As a 
winner of that recount, Gore would have been entitled to certification 
as the winner of Florida’s electors and would have enjoyed both the 
legal and political benefit of having finality on his side. Such a sce-
nario would have forced Bush to rely on an election contest of dis-
puted ballots, a challenge in federal court, or an appeal to the state 
legislature, with the considerable legal and public relations burden of 
overturning the official outcome of the election. The dynamic of final-
ity would have been on Gore’s side. 
 Despite the critical nature of the recount, Gore’s strategy toward 
the recount started half-heartedly, with requests for manual re-
counts planned only for Palm Beach and Volusia counties.208 Experi-
enced recount attorneys urged that manual recounts be sought 
throughout Florida. After all, as explained by The Recount Primer: 
If a candidate is behind, the scope should be as broad as possible, 
and the rules for the recount should be different from those used 
election night. A recount should be an audit of the election to in-
sure the accuracy and honesty of the results.209 
In other words, the trailing candidate is advised to look for voting or 
tabulation errors wherever they might exist. Eventually Gore’s at-
torneys also requested manual recounts in Broward and Miami-Dade 
Counties,210 but no timely request was filed in the other sixty-three 
counties.211 
                                                                                                                    
 208. DEADLOCK, supra note 53, at 71, 78. Gore’s selective requests for recount were 
characterized by some as “cherry-picking,” “mining for votes,” or “gamesmanship.” 
Touchston v. McDermott, 234 F.3d 1133, 1143, 1150, 1152 (11th Cir. 2000) (Tjoflat, J., dis-
senting). 
 209. DOWNS, supra note 28, at 5. 
 210. Attorneys for Gore were successful in obtaining a manual recount in at least one 
other county. See DEADLOCK, supra note 53, at 158. 
 211. One reason for not requesting a manual recount except in these four counties was 
that the attorneys for Gore foresaw a difficulty in timely requesting manual recounts 
statewide since a written protest would have to be filed in each county. Such a county-by-
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 Gore found the Florida Supreme Court receptive to a manual 
counting of ballots to discern voter intent on ballots on which no vote 
previously had been recorded by the counting machines. On Novem-
ber 16, the court ordered that the manual recounts could continue212 
despite the statutory deadline for the receipt of county election re-
sults by the Secretary of State. The next day, the court sua sponte 
enjoined the Secretary of State from certifying the election results.213 
At oral argument on November 20, the members of the court evi-
denced their desire for counting all votes and asked the Gore attor-
neys how long it would take to complete the manual recounts. Tell-
ingly, Gore’s attorneys had no answer. The Florida Supreme Court 
extended the deadline to November 26.214 Nevertheless, only one 
county, Broward, was able to complete its recount within the period 
of this extension. Therefore, on November 26 the Gore attorneys con-
fronted the worst possible situation. The extension essentially had 
been wasted, and Bush had been certified as the official winner. 
Gore’s attorneys now had ten fewer days to prepare and successfully 
prosecute an election contest. 
 Gore’s failure to appreciate the difference in law and dynamics be-
tween a recount and an election contest also pervaded the candi-
date’s strategy in the election contest. Relying on the position that 
section 102.168, Florida Statutes, required only that Gore show that 
there were enough uncounted votes in Miami-Dade to “place in doubt 
the [outcome] of the election,”215 the apparent strategy was to treat 
the election contest as essentially a continuation of the aborted re-
counts and to push the case through Judge Sauls to the Florida Su-
preme Court as quickly as possible. As a result, Gore presented only 
two witnesses and made no apparent effort to place the election itself 
in doubt beyond the potential of added votes from a few selected 
counties. This lack of a winning election contest theory or a compel-
ling evidentiary record ultimately sealed Gore’s fate. 
                                                                                                                    
county process is manageable. This author in 1978 oversaw the first statewide recount in 
the history of Texas. State law at the time provided for four to six different methods for ob-
taining a recount based on the type of balloting or voting equipment used within each 
county. To obtain recounts statewide in the gubernatorial general election, we simply pre-
pared a generic form for each type of county voting system and sent the appropriate form 
to a party representative within each county with written instructions for how to particu-
larize the form to the specific county and how to proceed. The logistical problems of timely 
filing recount requests in most of Texas’s 254 counties in 1978 were great but not over-
whelming. In an age of e-mail, fax, and cell phones, the logistical problems of filing such 
requests in Florida surely are more manageable. 
 212. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd. v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1220, 1225 (Fla. 2000), 
vacated sub nom. Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd., 531 U.S. 70 (2000). 
 213. Id. at 1227. 
 214. Id. at 1240. 
 215. FLA. STAT. § 102.168(3)(c) (2000). 
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 If any bona fide opportunity existed for Al Gore to prevail in Flor-
ida after November 7, it was through the manual recount of ballots 
by the local government canvassing boards. It was in the interest of 
Bush and Republican Party officials to delay and to confuse those re-
counts. Nevertheless, the chance of success for Gore was greater at 
the recount stage than in an election contest. Gore’s legal strategy 
failed to recognize the necessity of winning the recount battle. 
VI.   CONCLUSION 
 The events following the November 7, 2000, presidential election 
were extraordinary. The legal opinions resulting from those events, 
however, are of limited precedential value in part because they were 
written without time for a full development of the facts or the law. 
 The decision of the United States Supreme Court in Bush v. Gore 
is not novel for its notion of fairness and equal treatment in the con-
text of an election contest. State election contests before a single im-
partial arbiter historically have been the means by which disputes 
over the outcome of an election have been resolved and meaningful 
irregularities in an election have been corrected. Fairness in the 
treatment of candidates and voters is an essential principle of such 
contests. Any contrary holding would have been shocking and 
unacceptable. In Gore v. Harris, the majority of the Florida Supreme 
Court lost sight of these fundamental principles. 
 Although the intervention of the United States Supreme Court in 
the Florida election controversy may be unprecedented, its decision 
to bring an end to the recount ordered by the Florida Supreme Court 
was consistent with the historic need for finality in state election 
contest proceedings and was justified under the existing circum-
stances. It was Gore’s flawed legal strategy that reduced his oppor-
tunity for winning the election in Florida and that ultimately 
brought his legal battle to an unsuccessful end. 
